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Abstract 
Prior studies have shown that separatism within a repressed minority is one of the strongest 
indicators of rebellion. Further, ethnic minorities that are repressed based on their ethnicity 
develop grievances and rebellion on the basis of this. Religion, as a sub category however 
follows different patterns. Religion does not in itself increase the risk of rebellion, but in cases 
where the religious minority has an active separatism, probability of rebellion, as well as the 
conflict intensity, increases dramatically–even more so than separatism in itself. 
This pattern has been used as a measurement of religious nationalism. This is probable, but 
not proven. Further, the mechanism in which religion and separatism interacts to produce this 
volatile conflicts is not described systematically. 
Through a comparative study of three cases selected on the basis of prior statistical studies, 
this thesis looks at what separatism is an indicator of, how separatism and religion interacts, 
and through what mechanisms they seem to affect each other.  
What I find is, amongst other, that the religion separatism-nexus is not a measurement of 
religious nationalism; rather that separatism indicates a property of the religious identity-
narrative. If the identity suggests a bond to the majority, the probability of development of 
motive for rebellion is less. If the identity informs a bond to, in these cases, the West, the 
probability of development of motive for rebellion increases. Finally, if repression is so grave 
that motive for rebellion is inevitable, the identity will change. Identity and motive thus 
communicates, and both will change to align itself with the other. 
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Preface – Piercing the Texture of Numbers 
I always find prefaces and forewords rather meaningless to read. If you have an entire text to 
express yourself, what is the meaning of one page? Often these become meaningless pieces 
that just as well could be left out. This was my plan. 
Still, after having written an entire text myself, there is one experience I truly feel the need to 
express. In the beginning, when I was working with the statistical data. I saw the words and 
numbers, and read the reports and summaries. I knew what they meant, but not the gravity of 
it. Going into the case studies, what baffled me the most was the reality behind the data. Each 
little number and correlation in the data suddenly equaled hundreds of brutal murders, rape 
and torture on actual humans and families having to cope. Children traumatized for life, 
contrasted by the greed and self-righteousness of the perpetrators. The distance immanent in 
the numbers of the datasets seems intriguing, and the hunt for patterns a game. The reality 
that pierced through the numbers as I began looking closer at the cases was nauseating, and 
spoke to my sense of right and wrong. Still, at the same time as the cases made me realize the 
shallowness of the numbers, I equally understood that this did not give justice to the 
individual experiences behind the cases. When “Sudanese villages was systematically 
attacked by militiamen in the early 1980s”, this implied an individual crisis and a life 
changing trauma to each and every one of the survivors. Closing in on these destinies religion 
becomes logic as a way of coping with life. 
The paradox of the numbers is the way one destiny can make you weep, one case can make 
you think, whereas a dataset invites you to play. 
Statisticians studying conflict should never forget this; that each little number is written with 
blood; and each curve is an ocean of human lives rendered worthless and crushed by the greed 
and ideology of leaders. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and knowledge gap 
After being neglected for decades, studies of religion and conflict-nexus became a central 
aspect within political science during the second half of the 1990s. Especially in the aftermath 
of Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (1993,1996) the question of religion’s importance was 
debated and studied to a growing extent (Philpott 2009). 
One important segment of these studies focused on statistically testing Huntington’s claims, 
e.g. by Jonathan Fox. Through studies on the Minority at Risk dataset (MAR) he also 
produced a range of studies that set out to test “the religious factor” on minority rebellion1. 
Basing his work on mobilization theory and prior studies by Ted Gurr (1970, 1993, 1997), he 
found that religious minorities did not seem to react to repression in a way that comparable 
categories, such as ethnicity, did. However, close to all religious minorities that engaged in 
rebellion had a third factor present, namely separatism. Finding the same patterns in 
following studies, he operationalized this as religious nationalism. Still, one does not know 
what separatism indicates in this setting, and it is not given that the phenomenon is religious 
nationalism. Further, there exists no real explanation of which mechanisms this religion 
separatism-nexus follows. The knowledge gap I wish to fill is thus what separatism is, and 
through what mechanisms the religion separatism-nexus produces more incidents of rebellion. 
1.2 Research Objectives and Methodological approach 
To be able to fil this knowledge gap this study examines how religion and separatism affects 
minority rebellion through comparison of three cases. By replicating statistical studies, three 
representative and comparable cases–the Southerners in Sudan, the Copts in Egypt, and the 
Maronites in Lebanon–are selected to inform the analysis of the phenomenon. Through a 
mixture of historical comparison, process-tracing and congruence method the cases are 
analyzed to shed light over the religion separatism-nexus. 
                                                 
1 Rebellion in this context is to be understood as the violent resistance of a minority towards state repression. 
It thus offers a dyadic perspective to intra-state conflict or civil war. 
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Based on prior studies and reasonable assumptions I hypothesize that the religion separatism-
nexus is a measurement of religious nationalism. Based on the notion that religion need not be 
political I further hypothesize that separatism might be a factor that politicizes religion, and 
that from this point on the mechanisms explained by Juergensmeyer (1993, 2003), intensifies 
conflicts. 
What I find is that the religion separatism-nexus is not a measurement of religious 
nationalism, but that the identity-narrative of the minority, if informs a bond to the West, 
increases the likelihood of relative deprivation. If the identity-narrative informs a local 
connection and cross-communal bond, it is likely that a certain amount of repression will be 
tolerated, and that grievances will not develop. 
As such it contradicts prior theories emphasizing primordial notions of religious identity, as 
the reason for religious minority rebellion, because religious identities are seen to change over 
time. It also corrects studies emphasizing the importance of grievances and motive, by 
underlining these as most often identity-driven. 
At a meta-level this thesis, through a critical evaluation of the study of the religion and 
conflict-nexus attempts to bridge two different approaches to the study of religion and 
conflict–one that tends to apply statistical approaches and measure religion as a first order 
phenomenon, and one that tends to favor small-N studies and conceptualizations of religion as 
a second order phenomenon. In line with mixed methods approaches I hold that for the study 
of religion and conflict to be able to yield its full potential, the two methodologies must 
communicate. To make this possible one first needs to agree on the phenomenon one is 
studying. To do this I apply an analytical framework that allows for analysis and comparison 
of religion in both methodologies without losing the rigidity required for such analyses. 
1.3 Outline of thesis 
Developed between three different academic discourses this thesis begins by outlining 
previous studies and the theoretical background. Looking back, this chapter attempts to give 
the underpinning of the argument for why and how this study should be done. 
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The following chapter focuses on methodology and the design of the thesis. The theoretical 
framework is operationalized, the methodology is evaluated, and the selection of the cases is 
discussed and concluded. 
Each of the analyses of the three cases begins by outlining the issues and actors of the 
conflict, the period of analysis, and an intra-case comparative perspective is chosen. After 
introducing the background of the conflict, I give a historical overview of the period of 
analysis. The next sub-chapter deals with how religion can be seen to act, change and affect 
the conflict. In the subsequent three sub-chapters, and based on the prior texts, the analytical 
framework is applied and the identity, opportunity and motive of the minority is discussed. 
Summarizing each case I develop the conclusion that is summarized in the final chapter. 
13 
 
2 Previous Research and Theoretical 
Framework 
This thesis draws on several different academic discourses. As a consequence the theoretical 
outline gets a different purpose and content. Due to the limits of this chapter I have had to 
prioritize what aspects to include. This is a potential weakness of the thesis, but a necessity. 
As this thesis is based on replicated statistical analyses, the theoretical framework has much 
of its basis in these, and has to echo theire evaluations. I use the first part of this chapter to 
outline their discussions, evaluations and findings, and forming the basis of the following 
discussions. To investigate the mechanisms behind their findings I apply a closer focus. This, 
along with weakness in Fox and Nordås’ operationalization of religion, requires a different 
approach. The second part of this chapter will therefore focus on their operationalization of 
religion, how it can be understood among other academic studies of the religion and conflict-
nexus, and weaknesses within these approaches. As the enhancement has to do with 
conceptualization of religion I will, in the third part of this chapter, give a short introduction 
to such conceptualizations as an introduction to Feldtkeller’s framework. 
2.1 Nordås, Fox and Statistical Studies on Religious 
Minority Rebellion 
Group mobilization theory has identified three necessary preconditions for rebellion to 
develop – of which none is sufficient in itself.2 The group needs to have a common identity, 
an opportunity to challenge the authorities, and a motive to do so (Nordås 2010:121; Gurr 
2000:5,94; Deutsch 2000:851). Both Nordås and Fox apply these three factors to analyze how 
religion affects the development of rebellion (Nordås 2010:121; Fox 2000a). 
The concept identity offers two elements. First of all it gives the group a common bond and a 
felt common destiny. What is done to some concerns everyone. Secondly it informs the group 
of an essential difference between them and other groups (Gurr 2000:4-5). 
Opportunity reflects both group capacity and external structures allowing rebellion. Internally 
it has to do with the relative size of the minority, its organization, resources and alliances 
                                                 
2 Whereas some emphasize the competitive relation between the three, Nordås and Fox both analyze the three 
as equal necessities in their respective studies. 
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(Nordås 2010:122-3). Externally it can be affected by the politics of the governing regime, or 
a result of a transient situation whereby the opportunity opens (Gurr 2000:80ff). The MAR-
dataset can be understood to have part of this criterion incorporated in its selection of units, as 
a criterion for being a minority in the MAR-dataset is that you are politically active and of 
relevant size (Minorities at Risk 2009). 
In 1970 Gurr published the classic Why Men Rebel wherein he explores why people engage in 
political violence and rebellion in general (Gurr 1970). He identifies as one of the central 
factors for predicting rebellion is what he calls relative deprivation, or the “perceived 
discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities” – in other words the state you 
are in versus the state you feel you should be in – as a central factor for predicting rebellion 
(Gurr 1970:37). A group feeling that it does not get what it deserves is more likely to develop 
rebellion. Relative deprivation, through the development of grievances over the issues of 
deprivation, is related to motive to rebel. One of the strongest indicators of relative 
deprivation is repression (Fox2004:721; Nordås 2010:129). When Fox (2000a) analyses 
motive, repression is the central indicator used. 
The MAR-dataset aims at monitoring, creating data for analysis, and providing a risk 
evaluation of politically active communal groups throughout the world (Davenport 2003:5). 
Minorities are categorized in dyadic relations to the states in which they exist. Based on his 
work from 1970 Gurr did an analysis of the MAR-data investigating what factors were 
relevant when trying to understand why minorities rebel (Gurr 1993). In this study there were 
three categories of grievances – cultural and social, economical, and political. In this 
framework religion is considered a salient part of ethnicity and is not analyzed separately 
(Gurr 1993:173; Fox 1999:294). Fox’s (2000a) analysis of the MAR-dataset was initially a 
further development of Gurr’s analyses (1993,1997) regarding what role religion plays in the 
development of rebellion among religious minorities. The justification of this perspective was 
the growing literature and academic focus on religion as a reemerging factor in international 
conflicts after the Cold War. By reproducing a design close to Gurr’s and applying a mix of 
Gurr’s framework and group mobilization theory to the same dataset, Fox expected to find a 
relatively similar pattern. However, in this analysis for the years 1990-1994 he finds that 
religion does not seem to play a critical role, even though the usual criteria for rebellion is in 
place. Instead he finds that all religious minorities engaging in high levels of rebellion were 
characterized by a third factor, which seemed to be identified with nearly all intrastate 
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religious conflicts – separatism. However he does not conclude on this being the definitive 
factor. More specifically, whereas religious grievances seem to have less influence on conflict 
intensity than Gurr found for other cultural grievances, all religious minorities that had a 
factor of rebellion from 5-7 (Intermediate guerilla activity – protracted civil war) (appendix 
II) were registered with autonomy grievances (Fox 2000a). 
Briefly discussing this pattern he concludes that the two main obstacles for understanding it is 
the fact that the study did not systematically investigate the phenomenon, resulting in an 
inability to decisively conclude, what the variable separatism measured. 
In light of Gurr’s identification of separatism as one of the strongest predicaments for 
minority-rebellion, Fox (2004) elaborated on this finding, stating that religion merged with 
separatism seems to be an extra volatile combination. He also further suggests that it might be 
a product of the phenomenon religious nationalism as identified by among others 
Juergensmeyer (Fox 2004:728). He operationalizes religious nationalism as (belief 
+1)*separatism based on previous findings (Fox 2004:721). He finds religion and separatism 
behaving in the same pattern between 1996-2000 regarding onset. He also finds that this 
nexus increases the intensity of rebellion far more than what can be expected from conflicts 
where rebels are separatists but not religiously distinct (Fox 2004:728). This conclusion is 
further echoed by Nordås (2010:173) finding her analysis of intrastate religious conflict-
severity in need of another dimension to explain an incident of increased conflict severity. 
Her PhD-thesis is based on a mixed methods approach. Findings from qualitative research on 
the religion conflict-nexus forms the criteria for how religion is measured in following 
quantitative studies on an augmented version of the UCSP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database 
(Nordås 2010:31). Applying the group mobilization theory as summarized in Gurr (2000), the 
dissertation amongst others tests the relevance of religion in minority rebellion from 1990-
2004 Summarizing previous research she concludes that there are three general trends within 
studies explaining religious minority rebellion: One emphasizes motive (constructivism); 
another emphasizes identity (primordialism); and yet another emphasizes opportunity 
(economical/size) (Nordås 2010:126-9). She finds in here study an argument supporting the 
emphasis of motive and repression-rebellion dynamics relative to size (Nordås 2010:148-50). 
She does not look for the pattern Fox identifies, but evaluating her data suggests that the 
pattern that is probable even from the UCSP/PRIO-dataset. (Appendix III) 
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The nexus Fox emphasizes is also supported by the concept of religious nationalism, and this 
formed the basis for his analysis from 2004. Still I argue that the conclusion, that separatism 
measures nationalism, is a hasty one. To evaluate its correctness I will do an exploratory 
analysis of a selection of cases from the MAR-dataset. By doing this I will determine whether 
it is nationalism or some other factor. I can also begin to answer the question of what seems 
to happen as the two merge. 
This approach to religion also has a central strength contrasting Huntington’s Clash of 
Civilizations theory. In not identify religion as one first order phenomenon it produces a 
pattern which is comparable across all manifestations and contexts, it is thus far more 
compatible to theories of religion more commonly applied outside statistical analyses. In 
addition, based on its quantitative nature, it tells more about a phenomena like this in terms of 
general tendencies, than regular case-studies, where constructivist theories is more broadly in 
use. Together such approaches will add to a better understanding of the religion and conflict-
nexus. 
As the starting-point of this thesis it becomes natural to ask, what this nexus is. Is it, as Fox 
suggests, an indicator of religious nationalism, or is it something else? Is this a mechanism 
within religion that gets triggered by separatism, or vice versa, which allows for more volatile 
conflict behavior? Answering this calls for a controlled closer look at the phenomenon. This 
becomes possible through a comparative investigation based on cases selected through a 
statistical reproduction of the pattern. However, comparing religion across cases is in itself 
not straight forward. One of the problems related to studying religion is a lack of consensus of 
what religion is, even less how it can be measured. As religion in its nature can be conceived 
as a second order phenomenon, it naturally changes radically from context to context 
(Beckford 2003:2 in Krogseth 2007:65). Likewise, studies on the religion and conflict-nexus 
have had issues pinpointing the religious factor, and while one side has held religion to be 
difficult to compare across large-N studies, others have attempted to frame religion as a first 
order-phenomenon without much results. Conceptualizations of the first kind are often so 
open-ended that it becomes close to impossible to maintain rigidity across cases. The latter 
yields results, but most probably does not measure what it sets out to do. 
Attempting to bring something new into this picture requires a conceptualization of religion 
that can do several things: First of all, it needs to justify a cross-contextual comparative 
approach. In this study this is partially done through the fact that a statistical pattern is 
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identified, which seems to support a second order conceptualization, in that a third factor 
triggers conflict. Naturally it needs to operationalize religion as a second order social 
phenomenon. Finally, it has to incorporate a broadness of social religious structures, in a way 
that makes it usable in a comparative study. In the following I will discuss how religion has 
been conceptualized in conflict studies, with an emphasis on statistics, before I discuss and 
criticize Nordås and Fox’ conceptualizations, and formulate what is necessary to perform the 
following study. 
2.2 Studies on the Religion and Conflict-Nexus 
Religion has undoubtedly played a central role in several conflicts throughout history. Yet 
there has never existed a theory that could really explain this relation. From the beginning of 
the 20th century and throughout the Cold War era, the predominant theories predicted religion 
would diminish as modernity and enlightenment progressed. Equally, within conflict studies 
the focus on religion was scarce. From the 1970s the interest started to grow as religion 
reentered the international political arena, and from the end of the Cold War the hunt for what 
was dubbed The revenge of God began (Fox 2002:1). While this was a general tendency, I 
will frame it through the works of two central researchers, Huntington and Juergensmeyer. 
Both Juergensmeyer and Huntington published the relevant works in 1993, catapulting 
religion into the center stage of conflict studies, but represent different academic traditions 
and affected the academic world differently. 
Juergensmeyer, not as radical as Huntington, published a book on religious nationalism where 
he investigated the different ways religion seemed to affect politics throughout the world. 
Through an approach based on case studies and field work he was able to provide an inside 
view of religions influence on communities and individual believers. This contrasts the 
approach of Huntington. Searching for factors that could affect the pattern of conflicts after 
the Cold War Huntington in 1993 published the theory known as Clash of Civilizations. This 
work was a hypothesis in the form of a grand theory stating that religion, in the form of 
civilizations, would be the new pattern underlying conflicts in the decades to come 
(Huntington 1993,1996; Juergensmeyer 1993). Even though both are referenced by social 
scientists of all methodologies, their differences can be seen as the beginning of a 
dichotomous tendency within the study of the religion and conflict-nexus in the decades that 
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followed. The reason for this is, as I see it, the way religion has been conceptualized. Whereas 
Juergensmeyer treated religion as a second order phenomenon, Huntington conceptualized it 
as a first order phenomenon. The latter invites to statistical large-N studies, as the 
measurement is rather straight forward, and if done right, gives the most predictability. In 
statistical studies religion is usually conceptualized as a social and psychological system, 
centered around a spiritual supreme being. Often the social impact of theological teachings is 
discussed, but the discussion is not followed up by nuanced data (Toft 2007; Reynal-Querol 
2002; Philpott 2009; Nordås 2010; Fox 1999, 2000a, 2004). The reason for this is that data on 
religions are lacking (Nordås 2010:24-9). Only some of the above chose to collect their own 
data on religion and augment the conflict-datasets, but this is usually only a more elaborate 
variant of the original data. One can find data to some extent relating the number of adherents 
to different religions and denominations, but this is a coarse description and does not say 
much about level of devotion, form of belief, or importance of dogmatic teachings. More and 
more, the general conclusion emerging from statistical studies on religion and conflicts is that 
few patterns have been found which can be considered significant, and that statistical studies 
lack under weak datasets (Nordås 2010). 
On the other hand case studies on religion and conflict have applied a conceptualization of 
religion that accommodates the differences. Seeing religion in different constellations 
suggests an application of conceptualizations of religion in a way that does not invite to 
comparisons across more than a few cases at most. And the search for generalizable patterns 
on the religion and conflict-nexus among statisticians is, among the quantitative studies I have 
read and the researchers I have spoken to, considered close to meaningless. Naturally, through 
experience with religion as a changing phenomenon from context to context, this claim should 
be respected–but not followed. Whereas the conceptualization of religion is weak and the data 
is poor, methods cannot be disclaimed in themselves. For the study of the religion and 
conflict-nexus to be able to move the next step, the two methodologies, largely rendered 
unable to communicate by the differences in conceptualizations, need to learn from each 
other’s approaches. Statisticians need to question the existing data, and apply approaches of 
religion as a second order phenomenon. Likewise qualitative researchers should communicate 
to a greater extent with the statistical studies. 
Nordås and Fox have both chosen to augment the conflict datasets with their own data on 
religion, but their conceptualizations of religion are weak in that they are too broad. While 
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this ensures religion is framed in all its manifestations, it lacks the systematical categorization 
they operate with regards to rebellion. 
One aim of this study is to suggest a conceptualization of religion that communicates across 
both methodological disciplines, incorporating sensitivity towards the second-order nature of 
religion, while still being operational with regards to broader comparative studies. For this I 
suggest Feldtkeller’s recently published theoretical framework on religion as social 
communication because it represents the broadness and rigidity necessary for cross-religious 
comparison, while simultaneously being founded around religion as a second-order 
phenomenon. In the following I will firstly present an overview of conceptualizations of 
religion within religious studies before introducing Feldtkeller’s framework and its 
development. 
2.3 Conceptualizing Religion 
Defining religion has, as previously argued, not been a straight forward task within conflict 
studies. Then, neither is the case within religious studies. Outside of the primordialist-
constructivist dichotomy within political science and conflict studies, one of the few things 
religious studies have largely agreed upon is that religion is a second-order phenomenon, 
shifting form, purpose, and importance from context to context, time to time (Krogseth 
2007:65-7). Indeed, it is recognized that theological dogma and religious leaders can have an 
unprecedented influence over individual believers, but it is not necessarily always so. 
Religion, one or several, can equally be a marginal part of a complex identity. And even if 
religion is important, as Heelas and Woodhead (2000) writes, the way you practice it can 
make you have more in common with a segment of a different religion than elements of the 
one you follow. 
Still there are a multitude of conceptualizations of religion out there. As these are witnesses 
of, it is difficult to define religion without either capturing other phenomena or missing things 
usually understood as religion (Krogseth 2007:72). If one defines religion as “belief in 
spiritual beings” one often excludes non-western religions. Widening the definition, it 
becomes difficult to ensure one measures what one intended. The definition must always 
capture what the researcher intends to capture, and she must be aware of weaknesses. It 
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therefore becomes central to begin by asking what aspects of religion are necessary to capture, 
and how close one can go before losing sight? 
Measuring religion as a second order social phenomenon, it is relevant to find out how 
religion plays a part in the minority’s response to repression. On the basis of this the 
definition needs to say something about what defines religion. Feldtkellers’ framework allows 
me to do this. 
Defining religion as one of several worldviews, Feldtkeller goes on to compare it with 
philosophical and scientific worldviews. These are all systems whereby reality is framed 
across the four realities of the body, the material, the mind, and the social world. He thus 
defines these as in essence having an equal claim in reality. (Feldtkeller forthcomming:85) 
What makes a worldview religious is the way the wholeness of real is ensured by an “instance 
beyond the possibilities of human effort”. What man can do is to enter this “interpretation of 
reality considered not to be man-made”. (Feldtkeller forthcomming:88) It can only do this by 
symbolizing reality, and to do this it needs to use one of the four realities. Moving on he 
develops a framework suggesting how religion applies social structures to communicate the 
wholeness of reality. Through a historical analysis he identifies six forms of sociomorph 
communication of the wholeness of reality that religions can take: communication of  (1a) 
common descent, (1b) news, (2a) power, (2b) knowledge, (3a) humankind , and (3b) network 
communication. (Feldtkeller forthcomming:98) He finds these to have developed in pairs 
throughout history, during the (1) Paleolithic Age, (2) the Pharaonic Era, and (3) with the 
appearance of revelation-based religions like Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. 
This is a development of Sundermeier’s notion of primary and secondary religion, including 
additional aspects based on criticism from Jan Assmann (2005:65-7) regarding Sundermeier’s 
concept not being able to capture Ancient Egyptian religion. 
In Feldtkeller’s theoretical framework, religion as communication of descent is one of the 
oldest and fundamental functions of religion, dating back to the dawn of civilization 
(Feldtkeller forthcomming:98). In many ways this echoes Sundermeier’s concept of primary 
religion, which is meant to describe religion in small-scale societies (Sundermeier 1999:34f). 
Still this function of religion is not limited to what was earlier named primitive cultures, but 
continues to be an aspect of religious practice (Feldtkeller forthcomming:98; Sundermeier 
1999:36). 
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The characteristics associated with religion as communication of descent, are related to the 
forms of religious practices one finds traces of from the Paleolithic Age. Central here is the 
development of ritual practices that define and structure group descent. In the archeological 
findings from this period one sees that religious practice was associated with burials. One also 
assumes there were rituals related to childbirth and the establishment of stable sexual relations 
(Feldtkeller forthcomming:93). In later times communication of descent is related to rituals, 
and perhaps most centrally myths communicating ideas relating to origins of the group. 
Religion as communication of news is also related to the Paleolithic age, and functions as a 
parallel counter-movement. Where communication of descent is described as an in-group-
communication, communication of news is the parallel out-group-communication. This is 
based on wide spread similar religious practices, which indicate some sort of interaction 
between communities of different descent. Such practices are distribution of burial practices, 
sacrifice of plants and animals, iconographic practices, and similar statues (Feldtkeller 
forthcomming:93). This interaction is possible to imagine as both violent and one non-violent. 
Groups fighting each other may have stolen artifacts, transmitting images and religious ideas. 
Also relatively small groups could not sustain a healthy reproduction without exchange of 
sexual partners. Lastly, ideas can be communicated through occasional contact (Feldtkeller 
forthcomming:94). This is a parallel to the modern religious syncretism seen fore example in 
New Age-movements. 
As the societal structure in which humans interacted changed from the establishments of 
imperial political structures in Egypt and Mesopotamia 4000 years BCE, so did religion. 
From a societal structure that emphasized an inherent bond between members, the new 
societal structure was based on stratification of individuals based on their function in society. 
With this structure society would grow to larger units than the tribes of the Paleolithic Age. A 
society of this size needs a glue to hold the individuals together in a structural order – which 
the narratives and form of religions secured. Through emotive dimensions of religion the 
ethics of each strata became internalized in each individual – both justifying the elevation of 
the ruler and the ethos of each citizen. This new function of religion did not only offer a 
common divine identity, but gave the ruler a special divine mandate to rule, ensuring the 
subjects knew what was expected (Feldtkeller forthcomming:94). Communication of Power 
has certain characteristics that distinguish it from the other. The ruler was given a divine 
mandate to rule. The rulers themselves secured the stability of societal structure. This justified 
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certain chains of command, which often had mythological parallels. The ruler’s divine status 
was communicated through iconographical representations in the likings of deities and 
symbols communicating power. Also rulers are often installed by divinities, or have divine 
ancestry. Religious communication of power is often linked to violence. In Egypt there are 
images indicating the Pharaohs’ divine mandate for violence. Still this form of religious 
communication does not necessarily imply a higher level of violence. It can also be identified 
with the opposite, as monopolization of violence often reduces conflict (Feldtkeller 
forthcomming:95). 
With the size and complexity of the new society came a need for accumulation and 
preservation of knowledge, and the establishment of structures that could encompass 
communication of knowledge. (Feldtkeller forthcomming:96) Within such religious 
institutions scripture was developed, enabling knowledge to be stored and handled outside the 
human brain. Different orders focusing on different knowledge were established, and schools 
or teacher/student relations where put into system to secure the communication of knowledge 
in society. Traits of this form of communication were the establishment of schools and orders 
(Feldtkeller forthcomming:96). In modern society most of the knowledge-structures are 
secularized, but in many states one finds educational systems supplied with religious 
educators by religious institutions, or parallel religious education. 
With the emergence of religions like Buddhism, Christianity and Islam there is need for a new 
categorization of the forms religious communication can take. Parallel to Sundermeiers’ 
concept secondary religion (Sundermeier 1999:36), Feldtkeller defines this form of religion 
based on its universalism and individualism. The fundament of this form of religion is the 
universal and fundamental problem of existence, which all humans have an equal part in. The 
religion points to a revelation in which the solution to this problem is communicated. 
(Feldtkeller forthcomming:97) Buddhism has the eightfold path, Christianity applies an 
ethical or mystical transformation, and Islam prescribes an attitude and a way of life, ethically 
and socially. This solution is accessible to all humans, and is therefore closely related to 
mission (Feldtkeller forthcomming:97). Ethnical or cultural borders do not limit this form of 
religious communication, named communication of humankind. Unlike communication of 
power and descent, it is based on all humans having the same problem, and thus having access 
to being in a personal relation to the deity, enlightenment or similar. 
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The consequence of religion as communication of humankind is the sudden existence of 
religions where followers do not live in coherent and bordering societies. People can be 
Buddhists regardless of where they are situated, ethnical background, and political 
preferences. There might exist a minority adhering to one religion in a country where another 
religion constitutes the majority. This minority will then have double identities, with both a 
national and religious identity, with believers across the globe. And perhaps also relevant, it 
might separate them from the majority. 
This cross-national identity where all share the same faith and often a common ritual of entry 
leads to network communication (Feldtkeller forthcomming:98). Typical for this is that 
believers name each other as family. 
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3 Methodology and Research Design 
In this chapter I will discuss the research strategy and the methodological approach. In the 
first part I will draw the implications of the aim of the thesis and the implications of the 
theoretical discussion for the research design. Subsequently it is necessary to discuss the 
methodological approach before I define the final analytical framework and select the cases. 
3.1 Research design 
To be able to establish what happens when religion and separatism produces rebellion, I need 
to “open the black box” to access more fine-grained data and explain the causal chain (Elster 
2007:32). Doing this I need to identify the phenomenon. As controlled experiments are not 
possible I will attempt to mimic the rigidity through a multi-layered design. 
As the pattern is already established, and the question is what the mechanisms are, I apply a 
qualitative approach based on a comparative study of historical cases. Assuming that this 
pattern is real, this allows me to focus on the phenomenon. As it is a phenomenon where two 
concepts are combined with an unexpected effect, and to ensure the validity and reliability of 
the outcome, I select three cases that can inform the phenomenon from three different 
perspectives. With the number of cases, and the historical approach with open questions, I 
need to focus the analysis. This must be ensured through rigid application of theoretical 
categories. 
Moving beyond established correlations, this study becomes exploratory in nature. This calls 
for a less structured approach (Silverman 2009:122). In essence I can formulate what I expect 
to find, but I do not know what I will find. Accepting religion as a second order phenomenon 
calls for an approach where I am open for it having multiple manifestations. After testing 
initial designs where I quantified the analytical framework, I found this to be an obstacle for 
adequately measuring religion. I therefore landed on a more dynamical approach where the 
theoretical categories form the basis for discussions.  
In its essence this is a comparative study. As the aim is to identify what causes the difference 
in outcome the study is a most similar systems study. The cases therefore need to be as similar 
as possible. This is secured through the selection of cases. Table 1 summarizes the variables, 
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similarities and differences across the cases in their selection. From this point on the 
analytical framework and the questions becomes relevant. 
 
Table 1: Variables and Similarity in Selected Cases 
 
It is important to underline that the approach is not a comparative study as such. After the 
statistical reproduction I apply elements from three different methodologies to identify the 
religion separatism-nexus. 
The study has a comparative element in that it compares one phenomenon across three cases. 
Still, a controlled comparative study, as Mill described it, has strict requirements for the level 
of similarity and predefined variables (George and Bennett 2005:153-60). Doing an 
exploratory study on different conflicts, this becomes impossible. This is also a common 
criticism of this approach. Nevertheless, the inherent qualities of the approach have resulted 
in attempts at compensating for this rather than disclaiming it. One of these attempts is to 
combine the comparative approach with what is called process tracing (George and Bennett 
2005:181,205-32). In process tracing, focus is on describing how historical events came to be 
and tracing the causal triggers for this event. The strength of this is that it does not imply that 
causal variables are explicitly defined prior to the study. Similar to what Elster defines as 
opening the black box, this approach allows me to do a historical tracing of the elements of 
the religion separatism-nexus. Still, it is not a strict process tracing. Defining religion as a 
second order phenomenon means that I have to assess a wide range of aspects that might 
affect the outcome. It is difficult to do this in the strict manner Elster (2007:33) exemplifies. 
Process tracing is a central aspect of the analysis of the individual cases, whereas the 
comparison evaluates and summarizes the conclusions from the three analyses. Analyzing 
mechanisms inside the black box Elster often applies methodological individualism. By this 
he emphasizes the focus on individuals as the building blocks of every political action. 
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Whereas the case studies include evaluations and actions of individual leaders, the statistical 
and theoretical approach from the group mobilization theory means the analysis will both 
begin and end with a focus on groups. The individual aspect is thus secondary and a 
consequence of the element of process tracing. 
A third element, also an attempt at strengthening the comparative method, is the congruence 
method. This is a method whereby theory is used to explain variances between independent 
and dependent variables, and then predict a certain outcome. From consistency in the output 
the researcher can assess the validity of the theory (George and Bennett 2005:181-204). The 
congruent method is implemented in that I use theory to assume a certain relation between 
religion and separatism. I apply this to strengthen the overall analysis, as it both provides me 
with expectations in the cases, making it easier to make findings more explicit, as well as 
making the conclusion more concise. The methodology can thus be seen as existing between 
the comparative analysis, process tracing and Esters black box, and the congruence method. 
Finally, the analysis implies a certain level of counterfactuality, as I basically ask why there 
isn’t conflict where there is no. Counterfactual analyses can be justified, but they can also 
become too diffuse if they are not done rigorously enough. To balance this I will attempt to 
identify rebel-movements or incidents of conflict, which can serve as internal comparative 
perspectives for each case throughout, and especially in the two cases where there is no 
rebellion. 
3.2 Analytical Framework 
In the prior theoretical discussion I have argued why certain theoretical perspectives are 
relevant for this analysis. I will be applying group mobilization theory (Gurr 2000) in 
analyzing the development of rebellion, or the lack of such. To analyze the religious factor I 
will apply the theoretical framework presented in Feldtkellers' forthcoming the global 
transformations of religion and from Kommunikationsstrukturen und Sozialformen von 
Religion (Feldtkeller 2012). To do this the latter framework needs to be integrated into the 
first, focusing on how different aspects of religion can be expected to be found and identified 
as a part of the minority’s identity, opportunity and motive to rebel. 
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3.2.1 Religion as Identity, Opportunity, and Motive 
The concept of identity binds the minority together and separates them from the majority. 
Religion as a component of identity in this case therefore needs to reinforce this difference. 
The individuals of the minority need to be included by the religious identity, and the majority 
needs to be excluded. For ethnically distinct minorities the religious cleavage should reinforce 
the ethnic cleavage. For non-ethnically distinct religious minorities the religious identity is the 
central element of the difference in identity. 
Explaining religion as a component of identities is not radical. Understood as a myth symbol-
complex3, what religion does is to explain the role of the individual or group that adheres to 
the religion – who they are and how they are expected to act. (Feldtkeller forthcoming: 84) 
Many of the largest religions in the world have an exclusiveness clause, forcing rejection of 
other religions. Religions that claim to hold an absolute truth will also often in themselves be 
exclusive (Nordås 2010:122). Juergensmeyer (1993) emphasizes how the emotive dimension 
of religion, strengthened by a relationship to a divine force, leads to a stronger loyalty than in 
ideologies. Reynal-Querol, amongst others, sees religion to be a stronger identity factor than 
language and ethnicity (2002:29). 
Feldtkellers theoretical framework will fit the identity category, but only some of his forms of 
communication are informing identity as defined above. These are religion as communication 
of descent, power, and network. 
In most cases the concept of opportunity is identified with relative size, and in Fox’ analysis 
and in the MAR-data the initial selection of the cases secure opportunity in form of the rule of 
inclusion (Fox 2004:719f; Davenport 2003:5; Nordås 2010:117). As the cases analyzed in this 
thesis are selected from the MAR-dataset fundamentally the criterion of opportunity is largely 
fulfilled. Still, as there are external factors relevant for opportunity, I will include the 
discussion of it. Religion can also be a part of the political power potential of the minority, 
offering organizational. Nordås emphasizes exactly this side of religion when she addresses 
the question of opportunity (Nordås 2010:122). I operationalize it as the extent to which the 
religion takes part in the recruiting of fighters, or similar. This category do not follow 
Feldtkellers’ theoretical framework, but findings can be relevant in the light of his framework. 
Further, his categories will be discussed against potential opportunity factors. 
                                                 
3 Smith, J.: An explanation of how myths and symbols of nationalist movement ideologies affect the historical 
narrative of the group and the notion of right and wrong. 
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The concept of motive is related to repression and relative deprivation (Gurr 1970:24). If a 
minority perceives itself as deprived of central rights or opportunities, this deprivation can 
serve as a motive for rebellion. Motive can be identified with what in international relations 
theory commonly is called Willingness (Starr 1978 in Nordås 2010), and has to do with the 
context the minority finds itself in. Relative deprivation does not in itself imply repression, as 
deprivation could be imagined. However repression should in all cases lead to a sense of 
deprivation. 
Analyzing religion as motive I need to first establish what reasons the minority have for 
developing relative deprivation. To define whether these can be considered religious I will 
discuss each case. Here the usage of the identity-narrative, the actors and what institutions 
they represent, and the level of religious rhetoric will be central. I will thus need to balance 
between narrow and inclusive definitions of religion. A politician can be a religious actor, but 
he need not be, only by claiming it. 
From prior studies there are a range of ways religion can be expected to induce motive. 
Religion can be a direct motive for rebellion, as in cases of protection of the religious 
practice, or religious ethics arguing certain forms of violent action, Jihad, or the Christian Just 
War (Juergensmeyer 2003; Reichberg 2006). The concept of martyrdom can make fighting 
desirable for believers (Juergensmeyer 1993; Toft 2007). Religion can imply believers to act 
in a certain way (behavioral prescription). Religion often has non-negotiable requirements for 
how believers should live their lives, limiting the range of choices (Juergensmeyer 2003; 
Svensson 2007). Religion might shift the cost benefit-analysis, introducing infinitely high 
valuables. (Nordås 2010:125) Civilizational rallying, meaning support coming from religious 
kin abroad is emphasized by Huntington (1996:272) Even if the religious practice is not under 
threat (direct motive), non-religious issues can be turned into security-issues by religious 
authorities (Nordås 2010:126). 
Summing up I find two tendencies regarding the religious potential for motive. The first 
tendency is that some of the described motives reflect constant phenomena within religions. 
These are theological concepts and dogma speaking to believers regardless of situation. The 
other tendency frames religions non-constant potential for motivation of conflict. These are 
contextual motives which do not reflect upon deeper theological, traditional dogma or self 
protection mechanisms, but has its root in the interpretational authority of religious 
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authorities, and how contemporary situations can be interpreted religiously. This echoes the 
Securitization theory of the Copenhagen School. (Buzan et.al 1998) 
3.3 Methodological Challenges 
This thesis addresses the dynamics of repressed religious minorities in developing rebellion as 
identified in the statistical studies of Fox (2001, 2004) and Nordås (2010). It is first and 
foremost an addition to these academic discourses, and must be seen in relation to these. It 
does not attempt to analyze religion and conflict in general, and can therefore not be 
generalized beyond the context of repressed religious minorities. 
The study does not introduce any new information data on the cases. It is a reassessment of 
existing material. Leaning heavily on secondary sources, this thesis is highly dependent on the 
reliability of these. As all the cases have conflict of interests the evaluation of sources requires 
more attention; still the consensus within the academic discourse forms the basis for the 
analysis. 
A further weakness is that focus is spread across three cases. This limits how deeply each case 
can be analyzed and how nuanced pictures can be presented. In summary, the middle way that 
is applied to bridge the two academic trends also represents challenges. 
Finally, as I am not including the full set of at-risk factors from the MAR-project a reasonable 
criticism is that this study is selective. This is partly true, but also largely non-valid. By 
selecting cases based on at-risk, I would attempt an enhancement of the at-risk indicators. 
This is not what I set out to do. My questions are related to the religion separatism-nexus, not 
the at-risk factor. 
3.4 Validity, Reliability and Bias 
The strengths and weaknesses of case studies is directly opposite of statistical studies. For 
concepts that are difficult to measure case studies generally have a higher validity. (George 
and Bennett 2005:19). For this reason, and because of its strengths in identifying causal 
complexity, this approach is adapted. The inherent trade-off between qualitative and 
quantitative approaches relates to the generalizability and the internal validity. Whereas the 
case studies have a high level of internal validity, the generalizability, and external validity, is 
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attempted to be secured by linking the case selection to, and mimicking the framework of the 
statistical studies (George and Bennett 2005:20-2). This linking is also done to secure two 
other aspects. One criticism held against case studies is that the case selection is easily biased. 
This affects the outcome and reduces the validity of the conclusions. By selecting cases 
through statistical replication these aspects are reduced thereby strengthening external validity 
and reducing bias (George and Bennett 2005:23). 
The reliability of the study is linked to two aspects. Given the focus on three cases the 
analysis becomes highly dependent on secondary sources. Reliability is dependent on the 
reliability and the use of these. This makes it necessary to put an effort into evaluating the 
overall literature of the cases. Secondly, reliability is dependent on the religion separatism-
pattern being real rather than a product of statistical error. This is something I simply have to 
rely on, and leave for future studies to decide upon. 
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
As this thesis is handed in at the University of Oslo I chose to use the official ethical 
guidelines applying to this institution. 
Leaning heavily on secondary sources I need to be careful when it comes to honesty regarding 
the use of sources, ideas, and referencing (NESH 2010:25-7). Further I need to be humble in 
the light of the fact that I am studying cultures I cannot fully understand. Still, I will 
emphasize to correct this throughout the case studies (NESH 2010:24). 
Finally I need to be sensitive towards the fact that the issues under investigation are conflicts. 
On one hand I have to be careful not to label parties unfairly, and on the other be sensitive 
towards bias in the literature. 
3.6 Selection of Cases 
Because the pattern under investigation is identified in statistical research I will base the 
selection of cases on a replication of the analyses on the same data. Apart from making it 
possible to investigate cases from the exact pattern identified, this form of selection also 
allows for selection without theoretical or observational bias. 
31 
 
The replication of the statistical analysis is based in the MAR-dataset. This dataset also offers 
a qualitative résumé of minorities, which makes it possible to both evaluate the quantitative 
coding. Nordås’ analysis will serve as a reference for the selected cases. 
Fox’ analyses data from 1996-2000 and 1991-1994. I will look at the same period, but for 
practical purposes of this thesis will limit the selection to 1996-2000. 
There are a number of either miss-coded units or categorizations which can be discussed in 
the MAR-dataset. Whether they are a product of random error or ambiguousness regarding 
categorizations, it becomes necessary to evaluate the data. Because the analysis is based on a 
replication of prior studies it is important not to change the data before the replication. This 
needs to be done as correctly as possible, as any present miss-coding also was part of the 
initial analysis. The qualitative nature of this analysis however, calls for critical discussions of 
how the variables in the data.  
3.6.1 Property of the Cases 
In accordance to Table 1 the cases should have the following properties. Case 1 must have 
active separatism and have a high level of rebellion, to inform the analysis regarding the 
normal conflict pattern. 
Case 2 cannot have active separatist movements nor be engaged in political violence. This 
case can inform the analysis of how religion can be expected to function when not affected by 
separatism. 
Case 3 must have an active separatist movement but not be engaged in political violence. This 
case can confirm tendencies identified in the above cases. Further, informs the analysis of 
reliability of the outcome, making it critical for the thesis. 
The cases are presented in Figure 1, in accordance to the theoretical and statistical 
expectancies along three axes (religious difference, conflict intensity (level of rebellion) and 
level of separatism. 
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Figure 1: Minorities with members under unprovoked repression 
 
3.6.2 Statistical Replication 
In the replication of Fox’s analysis of the MAR-data, I tested for difference in minority-
majority-religions, level of rebellion, and form of repression. First I produced a list of 
minorities with high levels of rebellion (5-7) and religious difference (3). The observed unit is 
conflict/year, meaning each year with observed rebellion constitutes one line on the list. I did 
not test for active separatism as, according to Fox (2000a), all minorities would have this trait. 
The replication does confirm this pattern. Only one case is coded without an active separatist 
movement, the Chechen minority in Russia. I argue that this is either a miscoding, or one that 
does not reflect reality, as this conflict is generally understood to be a separatist conflict 
(Appendix II). In total there were 26 conflict/years, and 9 minorities represented. As the 
minority should have an as high conflict intensity as possible I chose to focus on the 5 
minorities with more than one conflict/year: The Chechen Sunni minority in Christian 
Orthodox Russia, the Kashmiri Sunni minority in primarily Hindu India, the Moro Sunni 
minority in Catholic Philippines, the Southern Animist/Christian minority in Muslim Sudan, 
and the Tamil Hindu minority in Buddhist Sri Lanka. Categorizing religious salience in the 
above conflicts between 2000 and 2004 according to Issues, Parties and Rhetoric, Nordås has 
defined the Chechen, Kashmiri, and Tamil conflicts as religion being a minor issue, whereas 
the conflicts in Southern Sudan and Philippine Mindanao are defined as having religion as 
major issue (Nordås 2010:235,28). 
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To identify the two minorities without violent conflict I sorted the cases in the MAR-data for 
religious difference (3) and low levels of rebellion (0). Based on this selection I made a 
scatter-plot, indicating level of separatism and repression. (Appendix I). I repeated this 
routine for all 7 forms of measured repression reported. To range the level of repression I 
summed the number of repression/years for each minority. This resulted in two lists, one 
ranging minorities with no separatism (B), and one minorities with active separatism (A). For 
representativeness I exclude minorities with only one repression/year. 
There are a total of four minorities with active separatism and more than one repression/year: 
Maronite Christians in Lebanon, Zomis (Chins) in Burma, Baha’i in Iran, and Rohingya 
(Arakanese) Muslims in Burma. In the case of the latter two, repression is not unprovoked but 
ambiguous. They are included to secure representativeness in the selection, but if these cases 
are to be selected it needs to be further argued. 
There are a total of four minorities with no separatism and more than one repression/year: 
Copts in Egypt, Amhara in Ethiopia, Christians in Iran, and Ogani in Nigeria. As with the list 
above the repression of the latter two minorities are ambiguous. If these cases are to be 
selected it needs to be further argued. 
3.6.3 Geographical Distribution and Comparability of Cases 
As seen in Figure 2, Western Africa only has one case, the Nigerian Ogoni. This is an 
ambiguously repressed minority, and there are primarily economical motivations for 
repression in form of displacement. (Minorities at Risk 2009:Ogoni) 
In the extended area of North-Africa and the Middle East there are six cases, and all forms of 
cases are represented. Southerners in Sudan have a level of rebellion peaking at 7 for all 5 
years. They are coded as Animists in the dataset, but Christianity is central in the conflict. The 
number of Christians can be discussed, but religious issues are a major part of this conflict, 
(Nordås 2010:235) and there is a Christian minority in the South which successfully has given 
a language to the conflict. One can therefore speak of a repressed Christian minority in the 
South which has responded with rebellion. 
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Figure 2: Geographical distribution of potential cases4 
 
 
The Egyptian Coptic minority has no rebel movements, nor registered separatist movements 
and has one of the highest repression/years of the selection. As with the Southerners of Sudan 
they are also a Christian minority in a Muslim society. The repression of the Amhara is 
ambiguous having only 2 repression years and is in addition a ruling minority. As a non-
separatist minority I therefore argue the Copts in Egypt is a better case. 
The Maronites are also a ruling minority, but score relatively high on repression/year (2) for 
minorities with active separatist movements and no rebellion. They are also considered to 
have several factors putting them at risk for rebellion. (Davenport 2003) As a relatively small 
minority with constitutionally guaranteed influence it is easy to guess why Maronites do not 
rebel. Still, they fulfill the criteria for being chosen, and is a part of Fox’ analysis. Other cases 
need to be evaluated, but ignoring this case based on initial impression will result in biased 
case selection. This specific pattern might be what signifies repressed, separatist, religious 
minorities not rebelling. 
In Iran there are two cases, the Christians who do not have active separatism, and the Baha’i 
where separatism is present. The repression is high but ambiguous, as both politically active 
and non-politically active are targeted. In addition to this ambiguity the minorities are in one 
state. If two of three cases are from the same state I hold it to be a risk that the analysis will be 
                                                 
4 Corresponds to figure 1: Blue cases represent conflicts, green represents minorities without separatism, and 
red cases represents minorities with active separatism. 
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overtly colored by the politics of that state. This suspicion is strengthened by the fact that 
these minorities seem to be under a similar and distinct pattern of repression, suggesting a 
specific strategy. Lastly the high level of oppression in both cases might in itself suggest why 
there is no rebellion. This is, as with the Maronites, no reason not to select this minority, but it 
makes Maronites and Copts better cases for comparison. 
The Chechen Sunni minority in Russia is a minority with full conflict level throughout the 
five year period. The conflict can be termed religious, even though only to some extent. 
(Nordås 2010:235) However, the only other conflict between a Christian majority and a 
Moslem minority is the Moro in the Philippines’. As both are cases with high conflict 
intensity they are not suitable for comparison. 
The final four cases are in Southern Asia. The arguments for the Iranian cases are also 
relevant for the Burmese cases.  Further, there are no repressed religious minorities without 
active separatism in the same area. The last argument is equally valid for the case on Sri 
Lanka and in northern India. 
On the basis of this I conclude that the cases best fitted for comparison are Christian 
minorities in Muslim, Arab states: Sudanese Southerners, Egyptian Copts, and Lebanese 
Maronites. 
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4 Analysis 
Analyzing the selected cases through the lens of the analytical framework I will apply a five-
step strategy. First I will introduce the cases focusing on issues and actors and defining the 
beginning of the conflict. Secondly I will give an outline of the roots of the conflict and the 
period leading up to it. Thirdly I will give a historical résumé of the conflict itself. In the 
fourth part I thematically describe the role religion has played and how it has reacted to the 
conflict. In the fifth part I will use the above résumés and the analytical framework to discuss 
how religion has played a part in the identity, opportunity and motive for rebellion. In the end 
of each case I will draw the essence of the analysis in a conclusion for each case. In line with 
the argumentation for the property of the different cases I begin by analyzing the Southerners 
in Sudan, followed by the Egyptian Copts and finally the Lebanese Maronites. 
4.1 The Southerners of Sudan: Issues and Actors 
Until the recent Southern independence, Sudan was the largest country on the continent of 
Africa. Occupying a strategic position on the Horn of Africa, bordering many of Africa’s 
largest countries, rich in natural resources, and having been colonized by several empires has 
made it a victim of strategic regional and geo-political shifts throughout its history. (Martin 
2005a:23) At the same time both ethnic and religious differences are central issues in the 
conflicts. 
The North can best be understood as part of the North-Africa Middle-East area. Its population 
is understood to have an Arabic descent, adhering to Islam and speaking Arabic. The 
Southern population is ethnically distinct from the Northerners, and understood to belong to 
the sub-Saharan African cultures. Though most speak Arabic, all ethnic groups have their 
own local languages, tribal religions and cultures, and can be categorized under the umbrella 
African traditional religion (ATR). Identifying the Southern as one group is rather imprecise. 
It is a large area with many cultures, tribes, languages and forms of ATR. During British 
indirect rule, the South was deliberately segregated from the North in educational, legal and 
local governmental matters. This led to less contact between Northerners and Southerners, 
and has been understood as one of the reasons for the failure of the construction of a unified 
national identity after the independence in 1956 (Johnson 2006:xvif). In the North the national 
identity has been based in Arab language and Islam. Resurgence of military resistance from 
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the South has throughout the 20th century gone hand in hand with repression and 
implementation of Islamist reforms in the South. 
After 1956 Christianity was only a minority religion in the South, associated with the 
educated and mostly viewed as a part of the oppression, distinctly framed in Hutchinson’s 
(1996:318) quote “the British left with their God”. (Beshir 1968:6) But as missionaries were 
expelled and churches became targeted to an increasingly extent throughout the 1960s and 
1980s by Khartoum, Christianity became a religion of the oppressed South, making it a 
religious conflict (Johnson 2006:31). In short, Islamistic politics of Khartoum at the same 
time targeting church institutions and Southern rebels has made Christianity a viable unifying 
identity for the Southern Sudanese. ATR also played an important role, with a predominant 
part of the population adhering to ATR, but the two play different parts in the conflict. 
Because of this both will be discussed in the analysis. 
There are many times in history one can start a historical résumé, but as the focus of this 
study is the 1990s, I find it natural to draw the historical lines back to the beginning of the 
Second Civil war in the early 1980s, and give a résumé of the First Civil War, as the 
background. 
4.1.1 The First Civil War and the Addis Ababa Agreement: 1958-1972 
Under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium, the South had been kept isolated to protect it from 
Northern exploitation. In the process of de-colonization this protective separation was 
intended to be upheld by implementing a federal, rather than a unitary constitution. But in the 
haste to de-colonize Sudan, the British granted independence before the final system was 
chosen. After the first election in 19545 the Southern federal party received close to all votes 
from the South. Within a constitutional democracy this could have led to an increased self-
determination for the South, but the military coup in 1958 left all possibilities for a 
democratic solution of the issue dead for a long period (Johnson 2006:28). 
The outbreak of the first civil war is generally considered to have begun already prior to the 
independence with the 1955 mutiny of a military garrison in Torit. The reason for the mutiny 
was dissatisfaction over the de-colonization process. The mutineers felt Southerners were not 
included in the new political system, and that rule over the South was simply handed over to 
                                                 
5 The first election was held two years prior to the independence in 1956 
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northern Arabian nationalists. They were followed by other garrisons settling on the other side 
of the Ugandan border, but were too weak to pose a threat in the region.6 Only after General 
Abbud led the military coup in 1958, and through following politics of Islamization of the 
South, did the conflict grow into a civil war (Rolandsen 2005:24-25).  
The new politics from Khartoum were a result of a change in the Northern nationalism. 
Inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood religion was moved into the political scene with the 
forming of the National Islamic Front. Throughout the 1950s the North was dominated by 
sectarian politics and the idea that Arabization and Islamization were necessities for the 
creation of a national unity (Johnson 2006:35). It was these political ideas General Abbud set 
into action after 1958. The changes focused on education, transferring missionary schools into 
state schools, and changing the language of instruction from English to Arabic. Missionary 
activities were restricted, and finally evicted in 1964 (Johnson 2006:30). As a reaction to this 
the Southern educated elite joined forces with the military mutineers and formed the Sudan 
African Nationalist Union (SANU) with the military branch Anyana7 (Johnson 2006:31). 
SANU united the Southern rebels from its formation until the military regime was replaced by 
a civilian and more moderate regime in 1964, which worked for a political solution to the 
conflict. The different fractions met at the Roundtable conference in Khartoum 1965 hosted 
by the new regime. But disagreement within SANU regarding how to meet this new regime 
led to fractionalization of the movement – one radical settling outside Sudan, and one more 
moderate settling inside (Johnson 2006:32). Both ‘exile’ and ‘inside’ SANU were weakened 
towards the end of the 1960s and the conflict was settled in the Addis Ababa Agreement in 
1972, where promises were made to grant the Southern regions more self-determination, and 
financial support. These promises were not kept by Khartoum, and throughout the 1970s the 
basis for the peace disintegrated (Rolandsen 2005:25). 
Through this period there is recorded a paradoxically change in the Southerners attitude 
towards Christianity. In the Catholic churches of Torit and Isoke church membership are 
recorded to have trebled over a four-year period, and in the Southern Blue Nile region 
conversion to the local churches increased after the missionaries were expelled in 1964 
(Lundström 1990:1991; James 1988:241-52 in Johnson 2006:31; Rolandsen 2005:76). 
                                                 
6 The identification of the mutineers as Southerners is a bit imprecise. Most mutinies happened in Equatoria, 
and the rebels had little support from the Nuer and Dinka (Johnson 2006:28). 
7 The Anyana, named after a form of snake venom, is in some literature mentioned as Anya-Nya (Bashir 1968). 
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Whereas churches in the South during the Condominium were perceived to collaborate with 
the colonial powers, the status of the church through the 1960s led to it becoming part of 
Southern resistance (Johnson 2005:35). 
4.1.2 The Second Civil War and Beyond: 1983-2005 
During the relative calmness and optimism following the Addis Ababa Agreement, there was 
no major fighting. Still, Anyana soldiers remained a dormant factor on the Ethiopian side of 
the border (Rolandsen 2005:26). Several factors are central in the resurgence of conflict in 
Southern Sudan: First of all, the growing Islamist politics from Khartoum, and 
implementation of Sharia as the public law of Sudan in 1983 (Al-Na’im 1993:26). 
Ideologically inspired by Iraqi and Libyan socialist Arabism, the Sudanese government 
propagated Arabism against the Southern non-Muslim population (Hunwick 1993:4). This 
resulted in growing alienation, tension, and violent clashes in the South. In addition the same 
pattern of church growth from first civil war repeated itself in the early 1980s and 1990s 
(Johnson 2006:35). This led to stronger church organizations and more Christians in Southern 
Sudan. There were also growing dissatisfaction among Southerners regarding the dishonored 
peace-agreement. Once again there were mutineers in different garrisons that fled to the 
borders forming guerillas. This tendency was strengthened when government supported 
Baqqara militias began raiding Dinka and Nuer villages in late 1970s early 1980s to make 
room for oil wells (Johnson 2006:44; Hutchinson 2001:312). International alliances were also 
making the Southern rebels stronger. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war established Israel as an 
alliance, and Southerners could from the 1970s rely on the support of Uganda. The 
government in Khartoum chose to support Eritrean secessionists in Ethiopia. As a strategic 
response to this, the Ethiopian regime began heavily supporting the Anyana8 soldiers residing 
along the borders to destabilize Sudan (Johnson 2006:36-37). Col. Garang, a Dinka officer of 
the army, was sent by Khartoum to mediate with the rebels. But choosing to join, he after a 
few years became the leader of the movement, which took the name Sudanese Peoples 
Liberation Movement or Army (SPLM/A) (Rolandsen 2005:26-27). 
From 1985 to1991 SPLM/A gradually became the dominant rebel movement in the South, 
with Garang as its undisputed leader. After several military successes they controlled major 
regions and cities throughout the region (Rolandsen 2005:29). However, in late summer 1991 
                                                 
8 From this period named Anyana II 
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three high-ranking Nuer and Shilluk SPLM/A leaders attempted a coup. They might have 
succeeded, but choosing to play on ethnicity probably made them lose support from the 
predominantly Dinka leadership of the SPLM/A (Rolandsen 2005:35-36). This defeat led to 
the forming of the faction named SPLA-Nasir. The focus on ethnic differences, primarily 
between the Dinka and the Nuer, would split the Southern opposition and lead to a separate 
civil war between the Dinka and Nuer that lasted until 1999 (Hutchinson 2001:308). 
Characterized by focus on ethnic differences, much supports the interpretation that this 
conflict was a result of the disagreements between Garang and the factionalists (Hutchinson 
2001:319-21). Indeed the Dinka and Nuer themselves have in retrospect made this explicit, by 
underlining this conflict as the war of the educated, not the Nuer and Dinka (Hutchinson 
2001:324). 
The organizational implication of the attempted coup was large. Instead of one organization 
there were two competing organizations fighting each other. In an attempt to gain momentum, 
the Nasir faction went into a tactical alliance with Khartoum, and further fractionalization of 
the SPLM/A led more leaders to join the Nasir-faction in 1993. Creating SPLM/A-united, 
they joined military forces against Garang’s SPLM/A (Rolandsen 2005:37). In addition the 
fall of Mengistu in Ethiopia, ledto the SPLM/A losing both military strength and territorial 
ground. Both through negotiations and in relation to foreign NGOs and governments 
Garang’s SPLM/A had to fight for a repositioning as the natural representative of the 
Southern population (Rolandsen 2005:38). Isolated in Southern Equatoria, and having to 
change tactics to protracted warfare, it became difficult to dismiss demands for reformation. 
To gain legitimacy among foreign NGOs, countries, and the Southern elite, SPLM/A chose to 
organize a National Convention (NC) with representatives from all of Southern Sudan. The 
goal of this was to introduce plans for a systematical governing of the South. There are 
several ways to interpret the convention that was held in Chukudum, April 1994. One is that it 
only was pro forma, meant to impress. (Rolandsen 2005:81-82) According to Rolandsen 
much points to this being correct, but regardless of the realities, the meeting served its 
purpose as a legitimizing of Garang’s SPLM/A. As a result the SPLM/A went through 
political renewal, equipping it with civil structures. It strengthened SPLM/A leaderships claim 
to represent all of Southern Sudan, and brought SPLM/A closer to a separatist agenda. 
(Rolandsen 2005:122-3) 
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Whereas the SPLM/A had been experiencing setbacks from 1992-1994, the government in 
Khartoum had experienced military and strategic success. Through negotiations they had 
marginalize SPLM/A, troops had retaken land, and a relative stabile alliance with the Nasir-
faction was established. Resistance seemed to be crumbling (Rolandsen 2005:125). However, 
from 1994, and much because of the NC, this situation changed dramatically. 
After 1995 most of the SPLM/A-united factions had disintegrated into warlords, and the 
competition for hegemony was largely over (Rolandsen 2005:133). From 1995-97, with a 
remarkably fast resurrection of its military machine and support from the Eritrean army, 
SPLM/A managed to recapture most of the lost land.  The government in Khartoum on the 
other hand became increasingly isolated both regionally and internationally. Neighboring 
governments became aware of Sudanese support of guerillas in Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea; 
and Western governments increasingly regarded Sudan as a terrorist state, harboring Islamist 
terrorists. Bashir’s constant calls for jihad against the South gave SPLM/A the opportunity to 
promote the conflict as religious, winning sympathy from the West. The SPLM/A military 
campaign lost momentum in 1998, but by the end of the decade no areas remained loyal to the 
Nasir-faction (Rolandsen 2005:124-125). 
From 1997-99 an oil line was constructed from the wells of Southern Sudan to Port Sudan. 
The Khartoum government directed this new income towards getting an edge in the conflict. 
Throughout the beginning of the following decade, oil and the position the Khartoum 
government assumed in the US war on terror, lead to less isolation from Western countries 
(Rolandsen 2005:128). Nonetheless, this development did not change the conflict dynamics 
drastically, as from 2002 a peace-treaty was signed, followed by the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in 2005, paving the way for Southern independence (Grawert 2010:1). 
4.1.3 Religion in the Conflict: Responses and Shifts 
There are several ways religion can be relevant in the conflict dynamics. Different religions 
have different ways of working in the conflict, and different actors use religion in different 
ways. One central function of ATR in Southern Sudan is to settle conflicts involving 
homicide. During the second civil war this became increasingly difficult for two reasons. A 
necessity for settling conflict including homicide involves identification of the perpetrator. 
Traditionally done by identifying who the spear used belonged to, this became impossible 
after introduction of guns. After the perpetrator was identified compensation was paid to the 
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offended clan (gol), a religious ceremony (cuil) was held by the religious leader (bany bith or 
kuor kwac). Both compensation and the ritual are necessary to make sure God (kuoth nhial) 
did not revenge the wrongdoing. The conflict between the Nuer and Dinka, which was 
traditionally present in a smaller scale, became hard to settle in traditional manners, with no 
unifying religious authority within traditional structures (Tier 2005:60ff). 
During the early 1980s, when Baqqara tribes raided Nuer and Dinka areas, ATR played a 
different role (Hutchinson 2001:312). As these used guns, they remained anonymous. In an 
attempt to categorize and handle the extreme violence these deaths in the religious framework 
of local ATR, the victims received the status of people struck by lightning (col wic) 
(Hutchinson 2001:312). Under normal circumstances death is considered final amongst Nuer 
and Dinka, but a person struck dead by lightning is considered blessed by God and ‘taken up 
to the skies’. The col wic is to receive a post-mortem wife and child that would maintain the 
link to the clan. The col wic would protect members of the clan, especially against gunfire 
(Hutchinson 2001:313). This phenomenon was rare before the 1980s, but after the link 
between lightning and gunshots were made, more people felt protected, resulting in more 
bravery in resistance against Northerners (Hutchinson 2001:313). 
Machar, a Nuer SPLM/A leader and a baptized Presbyterian, heard about this distinction 
being given to people killed by gunshots. In an attempt to make fighting in the war against the 
North more acceptable he introduced a distinction between government war (koor kume) and 
inter-communal war (koor cieng) that changed the status of homicide, and freed the Nuer 
fighters from spiritual consequences of murder (Hutchinson 2001:313-16). This was adopted 
and worked to serve his goal. Later the Nuer and Dinka tribal leaders further developed this. 
Towards the end of the Dinka Nuer conflict there was reported a distinction between 
government war and war of the educated (the Nuer Dinka-conflict). Through this distinction, 
the conflict was reframed as the conflict of someone else (Hutchinson 2001:319). Machars’ 
initial distinctions also led to a general de-personalization and secularizing of the conflict. 
Hutchinson (2001:316) believes this led to “the remarkable religious efflorescence that 
followed”. 
The leaders of the SPLM/A, even though belonging to the educated elite, do not appear to 
wish for a specifically Christian constitution. Rather opposite the SPLM/A has maintained 
great skepticism to church organizations, and emphasizing a secular constitution (Rolandsen 
2005:127; Hutchinson 2001:307,326). 
43 
 
During the first years of the SPLM/A the churches, united under the Khartoum based Sudan 
Council of Churches (SCC), were viewed with skepticism by the movement. But as the SCC 
split, due to inability to function from Khartoum, and the New Sudan Council of Churches 
(NSCC) was formed in the South, the relationship improved (Rolandsen 2005:30). NSCC was 
an ecumenical organization with an agenda to explicitly advocate human rights. It was to 
promote “unity, equality and peace among the diverse people of Southern Sudan” (Agurame 
2009:44; Rolandsen 2005:75). From 1991-97 the SPLM/A saw NSCC more as a competitor 
than anything else, but in 1997 NSCC initiated a reconciliation dialogue with SPLM/A. This 
meeting resulted in increased trust between the parties, and became instrumental for the 
people-to-people peace program, where the church was an active facilitator (Rolandsen 
2005:130-131). The NSCC has also been instrumental in the distribution of aid throughout the 
period of analysis. Foreign NGO’s have at times trusted the NSCC more than the SPLM/A. 
The distribution was not always as efficient as thought, but for SPLM/A the collaboration 
with NSCC regarding foreign aid probably gave access to more aid. There is also a high 
probability that the link made it easier for the SPLM/A to evoke empathy among Western 
countries, especially in the US where the Christian lobby has kept the conflict on the political 
agenda (Smith 2005:61; Johnson 2006:177). 
One of the most important dialogues facilitated by the NSCC was a dialogue between Nuer 
and Dinka leaders, ending their conflict in 1999. The conference opened with the “sacrifice of 
the White Bull (Mabior Thon/Tu-bor)”, a Nuer and Dinka tradition to lead the ghosts of 
deceased to wherever they should reside, and “sealed the covenant with the Christian 
worship” (Tier 2005:97-99). This worked as a ritualization emphasizing the different religious 
and ethnic traditions being unified in peace under the Christian umbrella. It also found an 
echo in the Nuer prophecies, that one day all of the South would be united as on people 
(Hutchinson 2001). 
In the beginning of the 20th century there appeared what is called Nuer and Dinka prophets, 
playing both religious and political roles. The prophets did not fit into the tribal structure, and 
did not adhere to ATR divinities, but divinity in general (Sanderson 1981:5). Some prophets 
even propagated acceptance of Christianity in the South (Hutchinson 2001:317). Still, they 
must be understood as a separate religious phenomenon appearing within Nilotic cultures of 
South Sudan. Throughout the later 1980-90s these have been interpreted as having foretold 
the future of Southern Sudan (Hutchinson 2001:317,326). Supposedly there would come a 
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war where Southern tribes would fight each other before they would free themselves of 
Northern Arab rule (Johnson 1994:336-338). 
Throughout the same period Southerners has to an increasingly extent started to view the war 
as a “curse from [the Christian] God” (Hutchinson 2001:325), where Southerners are being 
punished for accepting Christianity too slowly. This narrative, along with the peace oriented 
NSCC, Nuer prophets, and the lack of ATR mechanisms to successfully deal with the 
conflict, initiated the shift in the religious landscape of the South.  
4.1.4 Religion as Identity 
Common descent is throughout ATR seen as a guarantor of the wholeness of reality. When a 
person is murdered by someone, it is the clan that is entitled to the compensation. Likewise, 
when two people fight it becomes an issue between the clans. Further, the col wic, being 
central in the cosmology of the Dinka and Nuer, has a link only to the clan he belonged to as a 
living. Some clans even have their own myths of creation. There is a culture and language-
identity across different clans forming the basis of the general distinction between Dinka, 
Nuer, Shilluk, etc. Some of these groups, such as the Shilluk, have a notion of a central power 
and a common identity, but there is no sign of the Southerners being able to use ATR to 
create a unified identity. 
There are few power structures that have a religious significance. The first two decades of the 
Anglo-Egyptian condominium the British searched for a local political structure but 
concluded that the Southerners, apart from some cultures, were close to anarchistic. To 
compensate they tried to introduce these, but even today these do not have a religious 
significance. Religion as network communication has little relevance. There is a sense of us 
and the other based in the fact that the Southerners adhere to ATR and the Northerners to 
Islam, but this has not been able to create a common identity and rather formes the basis of 
inter-communal conflict between the Dinka and Nuer. 
As a conclusion I only find ATR to offer an identity based on descent. This identity is not 
very unifying, but rather fractioned as the basic unit of descent is the clan.  
Christianity does not offer an identity based on descent. Nevertheless, Christianity has been 
emphasized as a possible unifying factor, but this has more to do with the creation of a 
network where the common faith unites the different tribes of the South. 
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Similar to ATR Christianity in Sudan justifies no power structures. Rather, the importance of 
ecumenical organizations serves to underline the argument above, that Christianity in Sudan 
almost exclusively offers a network identity. 
Referring to the historical résumé there are some other narratives that are relevant in relation 
to a Southern identity. The SPLM/A has insisted on a secular national identity. This had 
support in the leadership of the organization, but the way leaders manipulated and applied 
religious narratives and distinctions shows how important religions were, both to the 
population and to get the support from foreign states. 
4.1.5 Religion as Opportunity 
The opportunity to rebel has as mentioned more to do with mercantile factors. Naturally both 
the geographical concentration and the effective organization of the SPLM/A, supported by 
neighboring countries, are the most central. Still there are ways in which religion has 
represent opportunity. 
Regarding ATR, the introduction of distinctions between different forms of war altered the 
status of homicide. SPLM/A chose to collaborate with NSCC rather reluctantly to get aid they 
probably would not have received otherwise. SPLM/A’s emphasis of Christianity as response 
to Bashir’s calls for jihad increased the international support for the Southern cause. These 
examples can in line with the Israeli alliance be seen as a political implementation of religion 
to gain an edge. 
4.1.6 Religion as Motive 
Leaning on the historical résumé, Southerners feel deprived of autonomy from the 
establishment of the modern Sudan in 1956. Autonomy was again promised in the Addis 
Ababa agreement in 1972, but as the agreement was not fulfilled a sense of deprivation based 
on lack of autonomy reemerged in the beginning of the 1980s. The strategy chosen by the 
North in relation to the oil-wells in the South also underpins this sense of deprivation. 
The enforcement of Islamic reforms in the South caused cultural grievances including 
religion. Whether religion was at the core of this grievance, or simply resistance against what 
was perceived as Northern colonialism is hard to define, but religion became part of the 
resistance as Christianity offered itself as a symbol of the repressed.  
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Central in the Southerners felt deprivation is the lack of autonomy. This has to do with the 
separatism. In the beginning of the second civil war this was not religiously founded, but 
rather political in a secular sense. As argued above the political leaders of the SPLM/A 
seemed to apply religion when in suited their needs. ATR seems to have been adopted by 
parts of the population to explain and cope with the situation, and Christianity through NSCC 
seems to have argued pacific responses. 
There might have been several reasons for why so many Southerners chose to become 
Christian. First of all there were reasons that allowed it to happen, or pull-reasons. Among 
these were the Nuer and Dinka Prophets. The push-reasons can be categorized as both hard 
and soft ones. Among hard reasons Christianity offered stronger alliances than ATR. Among 
soft reasons I would emphasize that Christianity in becoming repressed captured the narrative 
of the repressed population better. All of these points towards the reality that Christianity was 
chosen after repression. The population felt deprived, and the repression was very obvious 
and needed to be dealt with. This awoke a claim for greater autonomy. The fact that 
Christianity also was repressed, and that it communicated a unified identity different from the 
North, made it acceptable. It therefore seems to have been chosen because it supported 
separatism rather than being a reason for separatism as it was. Religion was thus not central 
for the onset of the conflict, but it offers legitimization of the identity of the Southerners, 
which again is necessary for a motive. 
4.1.7 Summary Discussion: The New Found Identity 
Throughout Southern Sudan there are a range of actors and narratives. Some stand out, and in 
focusing on these a number of conclusions can be drawn regarding the role of religion in the 
conflict. 
Religious life in the South can be split into two main factions, ATR and Christianity. These 
two follow according to Sundermeier different forms of religion, ATR being primary and 
Christianity being secondary religion. A parallel this is found in Feldtkellers framework, 
where ATR reflects identity based on descent, and Christianity reflects network 
communication. None of the two justify a power structure. 
From this, one observation is of interest. The identity communicated in ATR is a very 
fractioned one. One can find creation-myths specifically for units down to one clan (gol), and 
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there are several different groups of tribes, with different languages, cultures and versions of 
ATR. All in all the identity offered by the religious narratives are highly fractioned and have 
not offered the Southerners a common identity. 
It is therefore interesting to see the Southerners increasingly turn to Christianity. This can be 
seen as a result of several factors. In the face of growing repression from Khartoum, the 
Southerners began to identify with Christianity, probably as the religion of the repressed. 
Having become acceptable, it has also been framed as the religion that will create unity 
among the Southerners, and in the end peace. This process has been strengthened by the 
religious narrative that the war is a punishment from God, a church organization that is active 
in aid distribution, and ATR partially failing to solve internal conflicts by traditional means. 
As a parallel to communication of descent Christianity offers network communication. 
Through this a common identity across the South in opposition to the Muslim North is 
enabled, giving support to the claim of independence. As the network also includes Western 
Christians, support can be expected, and has been provided. 
This support has become important as opportunity. It has not necessarily been in the form of 
arms or soldiers. A significant amount of aid has been channeled to the South on the basis of 
its people’s identity as Christians. 
Between two actors that can be said to provide a Southern Unity–SLPM/A and NSCC–very 
different approaches have been chosen regarding how to face the repression. Neither of them 
has been able to neglect the repression; the politics of Khartoum have been so clear that one 
can talk of a relative deprivation perceived by both. However there is one central difference 
between the two actors. SPLM/A has chosen to respond with rebellion, and NSCC has chosen 
to respond with propagating Human Rights and negotiation. In an attempt at explaining this I 
suggest that the reason can be found partially in the difference of identity and ideology 
between the two. SPLM/A was a distinctly nationalistic political movement/militia developed 
as a response to repression. NSCC was formed as a response to the problems for SCC to 
function in the South. NSCC had a strictly Southern mission, working for the Southerners. 
However they were not focused on Southern nationalistic ideas. In 2007, after the situation 
had calmed, NSCC remerged with SCC. Pointing back to the initial argument: The 
Christianity of Southern Sudan does not emphasize religiously argued descent or power, but 
score high on network communication. In line with this a situation was seen where individuals 
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were not allowed to pursue their religious practice. This called for a special focus, but when 
the situation was eased, the network justified a remerging of the two – and following, their 
identity was not Southern in the same way as SPLM/A. The identity of Sudanese Christianity 
is therefore non-Sudanese. The application of religion from SPLM/A is tolerable as it 
supports their claim to be a separate identity. The network identity establishes a form of 
identity with other countries, but the context of South against North makes the identity 
supportive of separatism. It also emphasizes the sense of deprivation in that they do not 
belong in Sudan, making secession the only viable outcome. 
4.2 The Copts in Egypt: Issues and Actors 
In the wake of the recent Egyptian Revolution, the conflict between the Coptic minority and 
the Muslim majority has gained new attention. Even though violence has been kept at a 
minimum at times, and reemerged when such when extremist Islamist ideology was given 
room to grow, a certain level of repression has been present throughout the history of modern 
Egypt. Remarkably, from a comparative perspective, the Coptic minority has chosen not to 
react with anything more severe than minor forms of protest. Highly dependent on the pacific 
rhetoric of Patriarch Shenouda III9, it still remains paradoxical why the Copts have not 
rebelled or protested more intensely than they have. 
The Coptic minority in Egypt is a religious minority that according to different estimates 
constitutes 5-12% of the Egyptian population, and is the largest in the Middle East, counting 
between 4 and 8 million members. Copts does not reside in a unified area of Egypt, but have a 
higher concentration around some cities. They are not ethnically distinct but share many 
cultural traits and identity markers with the Muslim majority (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:24; 
Rowe 2005:89; Smith 2005:64). 
The central issue in the conflict dynamics is the repression of the Coptic minority. While 
Copts understand themselves to be an integrated part of the Egyptian society, a growing 
alienation of Copts has led to strengthening of Coptic organizations and culture. This 
alienation is based on difference in perception of what defines being Egyptian. This has 
                                                 
9 The literature operates with several ways of titling and writing his name. Both Shenuda, Shanuda and 
Shenouda is used, and in addition to Patriarch, both Archbishop and Pope is used. I have chosen to use the 
name Shenouda as I have found it to be in use most often. The Coptic Church most often uses Pope as the title, 
but the literature use both patriarch and archbishop. As Pope is more loaded in English terminology, and in this 
case has the same meaning as patriarch I chose, in line with the literature to use ‘patriarch’. 
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primarily resulted in riots and non-governmental violence–but the government has showed 
little interest in stopping these incidents, and the inter-communal clashes still remain an issue. 
The Coptic Patriarch, the undisputed minority hegemon and political leader throughout the 
period of analysis, has insisted on the Copts not being a minority. This has been the basis for 
arguing non-violent responses, strengthened religious practices, political dialogue, and de-
emphasizing the importance of any repression. In strong contrast to this, stands the response 
of the Western Coptic diaspora. A large proportion of today’s Copts are living in diaspora10, 
and especially the diaspora in USA has framed Copts as a repressed minority, and have 
lobbied for the US government to take action. On the basis of this, I will use the US diaspora 
as an intra-case comparative aspect in the analysis, especially when it comes to defining 
potential relative deprivation. 
The conflict dynamics as described above can be said to have its roots back to the 1922 
independence and the shifts in Muslim Egyptian identity that occurred after the 1967 Israeli-
Arab war. As there are no open conflict it is hard to put a date later than this, based on the 
repression. Nevertheless, the different regimes have had different ideological agendas, and as 
the period of the statistical reproduction is positioned in Mubarak presidency, it is reasonable 
to limit the analysis to this period. 
4.2.1 Disputed Identity and the Search for Equality: 1919-1981 
The Coptic Christianity used to be the majority religion of Egypt, but after becoming a 
minority in Egypt sometime during the Middle Ages they entered into dhimmitude (protected 
minority). This gave them a protected status, as secondary citizens, and with the patriarch as 
political leader (Martin 2005b; Esposito 2003: dhimmi). The Patriarch enjoyed nearly full 
political autonomy over the minority, as long as taxes (jizyah) were paid and the minority did 
not interfere in Muslim rule (McCallum 2007:928). 
Around the middle of the 19th century under the rule of Muhammad Ali the Egyptian society 
was in need of skilled tax collectors and scribes, and the dhimmi status was abolished. Copts 
were brought into the public sphere, and became free to participate in all aspects of public life 
(Van Doorn-Harder 2005:25-26; Afif 1999:275). When the British took control over Egypt 
                                                 
10 Throughout this analysis I use the term diaspora when writing about the émigré communities, and native 
Egyptian when I have to distinguish the Copts resident I Egypt. In the literature there is no consistent 
terminology in this field, and I find this the most precise for this analysis. 
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during the late 19th century the national consciousness of Egyptians grew, and tensions arose 
between the Western colonial powers and native Egyptians. Even though the British regime 
attempted not to give the Coptic society benefits, mistrust between the Muslim and Coptic 
communities emerged resulting in growing inter-communal clashes (ta-ifiyya) (Smith 
2005:66-70; Gorman 2003:156).  But parallel to the growing inter-communal tensions a 
secular nationalism emerged. Encompassing both Coptic and Muslim Egyptians alike, it 
became central in the 1919 revolution. One of the central propagators of this nationalism was 
the mainly Coptic Wafd party. In the process of decolonization Egyptians rallied under this 
identity narrative (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:27). The Wafd party afterwards felt so confident 
of the integrated position of the Copts, that when the constitution was written they denounced 
any clause giving them minority-rights, while Islam was made the state religion (Van Doorn-
Harder 2005:26). 
The interwar years represented difficult years for Egyptians, and as a response the population 
turned towards their religious identities (Philip 1995:131). One product of this was the 
Muslim Brotherhood, whose ideas received a growing level of support towards the 1950s, 
along with inter-communal clashes reemerging in strength. In this new form of Arabic-
Muslim nationalism Copts were framed as non-Egyptian, and their allegiance was questioned 
(Gorman 2003:162-3). As a consequence Copts entered into what has been labeled a neo-
millet system; a pseudo-minority status, not dhimmitude nor fully integrated, a position that 
has lasted until today (Gorman 2003:166). 
After the coup in 1952 colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, in an attempt to calm the situation, 
imprisoned more radical Islamist elements. He gave Copts certain rights, and maintained a 
good relation to the Church, but his politics also hit the Coptic community disproportionately 
hard (Gorman 2003:157,168). Abolition of political parties gave Copts less influence in 
political questions, and the neo-millet system became the only viable way of organizing 
(Farah 1986:49-50). Politics of nationalization of land affected Copts hard, many being land 
owners and several chose to emigrate (Smith 2005:74). Further the nationalism of Nasser was 
formed around pan-Arabism. This resulted in a general Arabization of society and Islam 
becoming a legitimizing discourse (Gorman 2003:167-8). 
Even though Coptic historians have an ambiguous take on the Nasser years, the following 
presidency of Anwar al-Sadat represents a more difficult period for Christians. The Ibn 
Khaldoun Center has recorded 8 incidents of inter-religious violence in the 1950s and 1960s 
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contrasting 49 incidents during the 1970s (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:55[24]). There are several 
reasons for this. During the presidency of Sadat extreme Islamists imprisoned under Nasser 
was released, and together with them the conflicts Nasser had attempted to isolate. Through 
involvement in the public discourse these organizations aroused fear of the Coptic minority 
(Van Doorn-Harder 2005:27). In general Sadat followed a more Islamist line than both Nasser 
and later Mubarak, not taking action to hinder violence against the Coptic minority. Towards 
the end of his reign and as inter-communal violence grew stronger Sadat sent Patriarch 
Shenouda III in house arrest to a Monastery, accusing him of inciting violence and scheming 
to create a separate Coptic state (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:27). 
The distinction between an Egyptian nationalism and a pan-Arabian Muslim identity is at the 
core of the conflict dynamics all the way throughout the period. Whereas on one hand 
different groups and different regimes have supported one of the two to an increasing extent, 
the Copts have continued to insist on an Egyptian national identity where they must be 
considered an integrated part of Egyptian society. In analyzing the Copts as a minority I am 
going against the identity of the minority itself. Yet, I find it both justifiable and helpful to 
understand the situation.  
4.2.2 Repression, Discrimination and Conditions for Copts:1981-2005 
The position of the Coptic Christians in Egypt is disputed which makes it difficult to depict 
one clear history of the conflict dynamics. I chose to focus on factors that can and have 
affected the sense of relative deprivation among Copts. MAR records several incidents of 
repression, which are one of the strongest indicators of relative deprivation. The concerns 
raised by researchers and NGO’s can in general be categorized into three different categories: 
(1) Legal aspects and political representation, (2) non-governmental religious violence and 
repression, and (3) lack of government policies and reaction to such violence. But first of all I 
will draw the lines from the historical résumé into the political landscape of Egypt in the 
1980s and 90s. 
After Sadat had been assassinated by Islamist extremists, Mubarak’s primary concern was the 
possibility of a revolution similar to the Iranian two years prior (McDermott 1988:68). 
Coming into power, he ordered the arrest of some 2000 individuals and declared Egypt in a 
state of emergency. Valid throughout the period of analysis this gives the president both 
judiciary and executive power. (Brown 2000:1076). Naturally Mubarak was not as supportive 
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of Islamist extremists as Sadat had been, but was neither protecting the Coptic minority (Van 
Doorn-Harder 2005:28). Throughout the period from 1980 throughout the 1990s the central 
focus of the states politics was based in achieving national security and political stability. For 
this reason the government locked up dissidents and suppressed public debates (Van Doorn-
Harder 2005:29). At the same time, and probably for the same reason, moderate Islamist 
elements were given room, and several Islamist leaders were released from prison 
(McDermott 1988:198). During these early years the state censorship also allowed Islamists 
to discredit and question Copts. As in the late 1940s and the 1970s Copts were framed in 
hateful tones, as crusaders and collaborators of Jewish and Western interests (Gorman 
2003:162; Van Doorn-Harder 2005:30). Even though the Brotherhood was banned, these 
ideas are distinctly Ikhwanist11. There were more moderate voices present, but in general the 
1980s and the early 1990s represent a period with a heightened aggression directed towards 
Copts (Rowe 2009:116). This is especially visible in the escalating number of recorded 
clashes. During the 1980s there were 111 recorded incidents and between 1990 and 1993 
there were 368 recorded incidents (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:55[24]). 
In 1984 the electoral system was reintroduced, and a few non-radical parties were allowed to 
be formed. Following this decision in 1985 Patriarch Shenouda III was released from his 
house arrest (Rowe 2009:116). This shows a less aggressive attitude from Mubarak’s side 
than that of Sadat, but still there were no incentive for the Egyptian state to stop the growing 
number of attacks on Christians until 1993. As the attacks became more common, and 
Ikhwanist ideas received higher acceptance within Egypt, increasing Islamist attacks on 
government security forces and tourists, “the lifeblood of Egyptian economy”, became the 
turning point for situation (Rowe 2009:116; Van Doorn-Harder 2005:32). It became evident 
that a good relation to the Coptic minority represented a security factor (Van Doorn-Harder 
2005:28). The government did two things. First of all, they started to target Islamists (Rowe 
2009:116). Several extremists were arrested, Friday prayers were surveilled, and the national 
discourse regarding Egyptian identity addressed. Through a revision of the state school 
curriculum, literature on the Copts was included, and mass media was encouraged to have 
more coverage of Coptic issues (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:32).  Secondly, the state went into 
dialogue with the Coptic leadership. The crucial factor relating to this is that the Copts 
through the 1980s and early 90s had moved in a direction were they were prepared to 
constructively collaborate with the state. Opposite to the tendency in the Muslim majority, 
                                                 
11 Ikhwan is Arabic for Brotherhood, and is used regarding their ideas. 
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Copts still regarded their identity as Egyptian, not Christian Western. Through social studies 
they had developed a categorization of whom, within the Egyptian society, their enemies were 
(Van Doorn-Harder 2005:33). This resulted in the Coptic minority not regarding all Muslim 
Egyptians as enemies, but as brothers and sisters. In short the Coptic Egyptian Nationalism 
seems to have made them not develop a general sense of relative deprivation towards all of 
Egypt. 
This process kept on through the 1990s, and much of the literature in general frames this as a 
period of relative calmness (Van Doorn-Harder 2005; Garman 2003). The MAR-data on the 
other hand, and amongst others Rowe (2009) reports murders of Coptic Christians to continue 
throughout the 1990s. Fox’ (2008:237) A World Survey of Religion and the State also 
categorizes Egypt as a land with a high level of restrictions on minorities in the period. 
However, much of this has to do with a heightened restriction of extreme Islamists. 
Nevertheless, he also report that the government did not adequately investigate violence 
directed towards Copts. Thus, the government seems continue to be more interested in 
national security. 
In the MAR dataset there are generally two forms of non-governmental violence directed 
towards Coptic Christians. There were incidents where Copts, Coptic property or police 
protecting the property were targeted directly by extreme Islamists, and there were a number 
of incidents where mobs of Egyptian Muslims had attacked Copts and burned churches. The 
data and the literature suggest it usually was a mob that, after rumors had spread regarding 
some Copts in the local community, decided to attack. The police was most often recorded to 
respond slowly and the perpetrators receive light punishment (Fox 2008:237, Minorities at 
Risk Project 2009:Copts). 
Even though the state is considered Muslim, within the legal system the Copts are not 
registered as a minority, and Copts are considered to be fully integrated into the Egyptian 
society (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:33). Still there are a number of legal matters that single out 
Copts. First of all the Coptic Church is required to get a presidential approval to build 
churches or repair a church building, a result of a law stemming from the Ottoman Empire. 
However, in 1998 the government took actions to make this easier, which has increased the 
number of Coptic churches being built and repaired (Brown 2000:1087f; Fox 2000b:140). 
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Prior to the 1930s Copts were leading producers of newspapers and journals, but towards the 
1950s they lost this position. Today distribution of Coptic films and media is restricted and 
does not go outside the church. Further mass media during the early parts of the period of 
analysis only 5 hours of media coverage related to the Coptic minority whereas 3000 hours 
was dedicated to Islamic teaching. During the period of analysis changes were made (Van 
Doorn-Harder 2005:32,34-35).  
Regarding representation in official offices Copts are represented to a reasonable extent in 
lower parts of state administration, but have no representation in higher offices. In all, the 
conditions of Copts are not very critical, but as a minority they are discriminated in legal and 
representational matters. Yet, during the 1990s the level of representation increased (Van 
Doorn-Harder 2005:50; Fox 2000b:141). 
4.2.3 Coptic Movements, Reactions and Responses: 1919-2005 
After the 1919 revolution the secular idea of “the one nation united in the cross and the 
crescent” lost influence. Facing growing alienation towards the 1950s Copts rallied around 
their church and strengthened its institution by revitalizing traditions, functions and 
narratives. This has been framed as a revival of three aspects: pedagogical, pastoral and 
monastic (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:38). 
Prior to the independence priests and monks were most often uneducated, but following the 
heightened focus on religious identities, a larger number of the educated Copts was recruited 
into monasteries and church service. This new generation of clergy became engaged in social 
activities and the Sunday School Movement, strengthening bond between parish and clergy 
through combining the spiritual and social practices (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:38f). 
Throughout the period of analysis, the church has continued the process of clericalization. 
The number of educated monks has increased and allowed Shenouda to ordain more bishops 
to supervise the priests. 
As a reaction to a low level of Christian curriculum in the schools, 1918 saw the dawning of 
the lay initiative of the Sunday School Movement. From its creation it has grown into an 
important part of growing up within the Coptic minority, raising consciousness on doctrinal 
questions, church loyalty and creating new generations of active church members (Van 
Doorn-Harder 2005:40f). 
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The monastic revival has emphasized the monk as the core of the Coptic Church. Through the 
statement “(…) every Copt [is] a monk.” the monastic ideal is internalized and made part of 
what it means to be a Copt (Van Doorn-Harder 2005 44-45). Through this revival the church 
has become the unifying factor within the minority. The leadership has become competent 
and strong, and Copts in general are both loyal to and partaking in Church life and 
organization. Still, why the leadership has chosen a pacific response is not answered by this. 
Looking at movements with grievances I will attempt to answer this. 
During the 1950s the literature reports of one incident of a Coptic separatist militia. As a 
reaction to the burning of a Coptic Church in Suez followed by the murder of several Copts, 
the organization Jama’at al-Umma al-Quibtiyya (JUQ) was founded by a Coptic lawyer in 
1952. A separatist movement formed with the rather diffuse aim of initiating a revival of 
Coptic culture, it formed a militia and offered arms and training. Its founder claimed it had 
92,000 members but the number is probably highly exaggerated. After it was made illegal in 
1954 it went underground. Its most spectacular act was the kidnapping of Patriarch Anba 
Yusab II in 1954, which had little effect (Gorman 2003:169-71). As mentioned above this was 
a minor organization with little effect on Coptic attitudes in the decades that followed. Still, 
being an example of a Coptic separatist movement it serves to show, first, that such narratives 
did exist, secondly how little influence such narratives had in the years that followed, and 
lastly that the Coptic community had the means to establish such an organization. 
After the failure of the Wafd project, and being increasingly alienated, the Coptic community 
went through reorganization. Through the revival and its position in the neo-millet system the 
Church organization became increasingly strengthened (Rowe 2009:113; Smith 2005:76). At 
the beginning of the 1970s Shenouda III was appointed Patriarch. He showed a political 
strength and willingness his predecessor had not. In a situation where concerns were raised by 
the Western diaspora, extreme Islamism was growing, and incidents of churches being 
burned, Shenouda arranged conferences and demonstrations that voiced the concerns of 
Coptic Christians (Rowe 2009:114). Sadat, having become dependent on the support of 
Islamists throughout his presidency tackled the situation by openly accusing the Coptic 
Church leadership of separatism, working for a Coptic state around Assuit (Farah 1986:2-5; 
Van Doorn-Harder 2005:27; Smith 2005:63). Regarded as a rebellious religious leader 
Shenouda was put under house arrest, and only released in 1985. After this Shenouda III, and 
the Coptic community chose a quietist approach regarding sectarian questions. Among native 
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Egyptian Copts it has become close to a taboo to focus on aspects of conflict. Literature that 
focuses on Coptic-Muslim conflicts does not receive the approval of the Patriarch, which 
effectively means it will not be read by Egyptian Copts (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:33). This 
has throughout Mubarak’s presidency resulted in a growing tension between the Egyptian 
native Copts, and the Western diaspora (Smith 2005:62). Whereas native Copts have chosen 
to oversee incidents or factors that could lead to a sense of relative deprivation, the Western 
diaspora has chosen to focus on these aspects. The Western diaspora has through lobbying 
and media stunts to an increasingly extent been able to frame Copts as a minority under grave 
discrimination and repression (Rowe 2001:86). On the other hand, by clinging to the 
argument that “Egypt makes Copts into what they are” the Native Church has effectively 
defined the Muslim Egyptians as brothers and sisters. Even though it could be criticized for 
being naïve, this position created a room that made it possible to identify the enemy more 
precisely, and paved the way for a reconciliatory process as soon as the government saw it 
prudent. When this happened after 1993 the Coptic Church went into an alliance with the 
Mubarak government which has ledto improving conditions for the Coptic minority. The 
diaspora on the other hand, focusing on the areas and incidents of conflict, has found itself on 
collision course with both the Egyptian government and the Coptic Church (Smith 2005:77). 
The diaspora, and especially the one in the US, has become more in tune with Western 
thinking and politics, and throughout the 1990s allied themselves with lobbies on the 
Christian Right (Rowe 2001:88f). As the native Copts have a close identity to the Egyptian, 
which becomes clear in their support for the Palestinians and in protesting the US Iraqi 
invasion in 2003, (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:48) the diasporas alliance with the Christian Right 
in the US has strengthened the assumption that the US Copts are playing a part for an 
American and Zionist imperial conspiracy (Rowe 2001:89).  The US Coptic lobby has during 
the 1990s focused their effort on monitoring oppression of Copts in Egypt. As an example, 
when in 2000 there were incidents of inter-communal clashes in el-Kosheh, the Coptic lobby 
produced reports, articles, and mobilized the continuing campaign on their web-pages in 
“solidarity with the persecuted Copts” (Rowe 2001:90). Whereas the Egyptian Coptic 
community and the Church has communicated satisfaction and loyalty towards the Egyptian 
government, this becomes an indication of how the sense of relative deprivation is felt more 
by Copts in diaspora than the in Egypt (Smith 2005:63). 
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4.2.4 Religion as Identity 
Among native Egyptian Copts descent is emphasized as a central aspect of what it means to 
be a Copt. They still consider themselves to be descendants of the Pharaonic culture. (Smith 
2005:64). The national identity and loyalty, is further continuously underlined in the Coptic 
identity narrative. Smith (2005:79) argues that the Egyptian and Coptic identities exist in 
“different spheres”, and thus emphasize their separate functions. Still I argue that the way the 
Church has taken sides with the Egyptian government in international affairs, and give these 
religious implications, is an argument for how the identities are linked. An example of this is 
how the Church has banned all pilgrimages to Israel based in the political conflict between the 
two countries. Contrary to the “worldwide Christian allegiance to holly places in Israel”, 
Copts will be excommunicated if they go there on pilgrimage (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:33). 
Further Shenouda has written that Copts that attack Egypt or Mubarak can no longer be 
considered Copts (Smith 2005:61).  Smith is however right claiming that being Coptic is 
different from being Egyptian in the sense that all Egyptians are not Copts. Still Egypt is held 
as what defines Copts. Naturally there are more to the Coptic identity than this religiously 
argued nationalism, but in analyzing the relations between the native Egyptian Copts, the 
diaspora and the Egyptian Muslims it becomes central. Whereas the Muslim majority has 
moved towards a nationalism that excludes or marginalizes Copts, the native Copts have 
continued to emphasize an Egyptian nationalism that encompasses the cross and the crescent 
equally, insisting their place in Egypt (Rowe 2005:102). 
The Coptic minority has religious power structures as a central part of their organization. The 
strengthening of the position of the Patriarch from 1919-1970, and the way in which the 
patriarch has been the undisputed minority hegemon throughout the period of analysis shows 
a strong religious organization. In addition this church seems be a guarantor of the wholeness 
of reality. An example of this is how Copts that for practical reasons have become Protestants 
still continue to practice the Coptic rite (Smith 2005:65). The patriarch also has strong control 
over native Copts, both when it comes to formation of opinions and actions. 
The Coptic Orthodox Church is proud of its role in the first ecumenical meetings in the first 
centuries, and has in recent years been active in World Council of Churches and Middle East 
Council of Churches. However this choice seems to be a more political than having any 
relevance for Coptic identity. As an example of this, the Church and its members has chosen 
to support the international politics of the Egyptian government, rather than that of Christian 
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nations elsewhere. Copts also generally dislike being labeled Christians on identity cards as it 
coupled them with Western Christians (Smith 2005:64). In short they partake in ecumenical 
processes, but do not let it affect their identity. 
The diaspora has throughout the period of analysis developed a different identity. The 
Egyptianness is made abstract and internalized (Van Doorn-Harder 2005:33). Being Egyptian 
is not something that makes them have relate to the Muslim population, it is something 
abstract, which gives them the right to criticize. In this sense the descent is still important, but 
made more abstract. 
The authority of the Patriarch is global, still the opinion of the Western diaspora seems to not 
be affected by the Egyptian church. As it chose political quietism, the diaspora went into 
alliance with the US Christian Right. First of all, this shows how the Western diaspora has 
become integrated into Western societies. By making such an alliance they are no longer an 
isolated Coptic cell outside Egypt, but partaking in the public discourse. Further it shows that 
the diaspora stands closer to the way the Western Christian lobby speaks about Christian 
minorities in the Muslim world, than that of the Coptic minority itself. 
Lastly the disagreement between the mother church and the diaspora has led to a contest over 
the power to define the reality of Copts in Egypt. The central web pages on the Coptic 
situation is either under Church control, emphasizing that Copts are neither a minority nor 
repressed, or channels for the Western diaspora, claiming that Copts are under severe 
repression (Smith 2005:61). 
4.2.5 Religion as Opportunity 
The native Egyptian Copts opportunity to rebel is rather obvious. Apart from not having a 
high geographical concentration, the organization is strong and has a history of both militias 
and organizing protests. The Church also has wide political power and potential support from 
the diaspora if they wished at some point to engage in violent protest. 
The diaspora seem not to have the opportunity to rebel. Most probably they use the political 
influence they can wield already, and with little effect on the ground. 
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4.2.6 Religion as Motive 
Leaning on the historical résumé there are several issues that the diaspora could have, and 
have developed a sense of relative deprivation over. Where Copts once were perceived as 
equal members of society, the neo-millet system represents a deprivation of equality. Nasser’s 
politics, depriving Copts of land and influence disproportionately, are also a factor in this 
sense. The marginalization under Sadat’s presidency and the isolation from the national 
identity is also relevant. These factors did indeed become actualized by the native and 
diaspora Coptic protests during the 1970s, as well as by JUQ after 1952. 
During the period of analysis the situation seemed to stabilize, and apart from the clashes and 
general animosity from the Muslim majority, there were no changes made that can be said to 
further deprive the Coptic minority of rights. Still the legal, representational and inter-
communal issues remained present. However, where the Church in the 1970s chose to protest 
against these issues, from 1981-93 they chose to apply a political quietism. This might have 
been a result of Shenouda fearing the consequences, acceptance of the fact that the 
government had its agenda regardless, or based on recognition of the fact that being the 
political spokes person of the Copts represented benefits. Regardless this led to the 
development of a pacific attitude, where issues of conflict were dealt with behind closed 
doors, and where the positive aspects of Coptic life were emphasized. Regardless of the 
reasons the argument for this was based in the emphasis of the common identity of all 
Egyptians. From 1993-2005 the Church continued to emphasize this narrative framing Egypt 
and Copts as inseparable, but now also with the support of the government. During this period 
the legal aspects and the representational, as well as discrimination in mass media-
representation, was accommodated by the government. Even endowments confiscated under 
Nasser were returned. The only factor that continued in strength was the inter-communal 
violence. 
Whereas Shenouda claims these are not systematical, and that the government is not to be 
held responsible, the diaspora has used these incidents and neglect from the government, to 
create a picture where Egyptian Copts are repressed. As the native Copts went into quietism, 
the diaspora went into alliance with Western Christian lobbies. This alliance seems to have 
affected their rhetoric, agenda and perspective. But, to not being able to view the Coptic 
minority in the landscape of minorities in Egypt, this has given a one sided focus where every 
issue is seen in a pattern of repression of Christian minorities in the Middle East. In short, the 
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distance from the issues and their integration into the US society gives them the opportunity 
to continue to nurture a motive for protest. 
4.2.7 Summary Discussion: Coptic First, Then Egyptian, Christian Last 
The Egyptian Copts traditionally emphasizes a common Egyptian descent. This has been a 
stronger identity than the Christian Network identity. The emphasis of descent can be 
understood as more important as a guaranty for the wholeness of reality, than the identity 
stressing the difference between the Muslims and Coptic Christians. There are two 
movements going in each direction from this point on. First of all, as a response to repression 
the Copts have chosen to isolate and strengthen their own tradition and communal identity. 
Through this the church-organization, and communication of power, has grown stronger, and 
the Patriarch has become the only contestant for the role as minority hegemon. Further the 
focus on education and knowledge has become stronger. The Patriarch has been operational in 
this development. Studies of who the repressors are, have led to a more targeted response to 
repression, emphasizing the few rather than the many. This has led the Copts to be able to 
continue emphasizing the common descent. 
Opposing this trend is the identity developing amongst Copts living abroad. Throughout the 
last decades the Coptic Church has had to deal with a growing diaspora. Especially in the US 
has the emphasis of the common identity with Muslim Egyptians decreased in importance. 
Emphasis of the Copts as a repressed minority, non-Egyptian resident Copts have been able to 
find support through the Christian network. If this identity had developed among Egyptian 
Copts as well, this could have represented a strengthened opportunity to rebel. This emphasis 
of descent and knowledge has led to Copts developing a low level of felt deprivation. The 
lack of this identity has among the diaspora led to a perceived deprivation. I therefore 
conclude that the identity of common descent has led to a lack of motive to rebel. 
An interesting factor I wish to underline at this point is that the Copts are not separatist. 
However they are nationalists. Even though this is not religious nationalism as described by 
Juergensmeyer (1993) this suggests that Fox’ assumption and my hypothesis, that the pattern 
has to do with religious nationalism, is wrong. It is tempting to claim that this is a form of 
religious nationalism that has produced a pacific response. The claim that something has 
politicized religion is also weakened, as the Church is highly politically active and using 
religious narratives in their politics. Rather it suggests, contrary to Nordås (2010) conclusion 
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of identity being secondary to motive, that identity can inform motive. As it has done in 
Southern Sudan, motive and identity goes hand in hand. The only difference is that in Sudan 
identity was changed to accommodate the need for motive, whereas in Egypt motive was 
hindered by identity. Finally, two observations are important to address. Religious leaders of 
the minority, through both cases, are generally associated with dialogical peace initiatives. On 
the other hand, lay leaders seem to be associated with conflict. Further, Western identities that 
focus on network rather than descent is associated with conflict. Egyptians that place their 
identity in today’s Egypt is associated with lack of grievances. The diaspora having their 
identity in a Western context, is associated with stronger motives for rebellion. This is a 
parallel to the Sudanese case where a growing Christian network identity, and Western 
alliance, has developed as an answer to repression. This point in a direction supporting an 
identity based explanation of why religion triggers conflict. Motive is not irrelevant, and most 
importantly, identity not constant, but an identity that supports the notion of difference 
between the majority and minority allows hard factors, such as repression, to develop relative 
deprivation, and subsequently become a reason for conflict. This might be the telltale to what 
lies behind the factor separatism. Still, the conformation of whether these ideas reach beyond 
a two case comparison will depend on the third case. 
4.3 The Maronites in Lebanon: Issues and Actors 
Since the independence in 1943 Lebanon has experienced more or less unstable situations, 
partly because of inter-communal conflicts, and partly spillover from neighboring countries. 
Most severe was the Lebanese Civil War in 1975—1990 where inter-communal tensions 
played a central role. Since the 1990s there has been relative stability. 
Lebanon is in many ways a rather special case. It is constituted around a division of power 
between four religiously defined minorities. Originally created by the French as a protective 
harbor for the Christian Maronites, these used to constitute over 50% of the population. Hence 
when the constitution was adopted in 1943 Maronites were given six parliamentary seats for 
every five seats given to the other minorities. With time the respective sizes of the different 
minorities have changed drastically. There has not been an official census since 1937, but 
there have been several attempts at estimates. Based on these one assumes that Maronites 
today constitute around 21%, whereas the Sunnis are the largest population group. After the 
Civil War, and because of the changes in composition of the population, the Ta’if peace 
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accord altered the power balance. Due to historical developments this change goes against 
what has become defined as Lebanese nationalism. Under Ottoman rule Lebanon and Syria 
were one region, and Lebanese nationalism was a construct of the post-WWI French mandate, 
defining Lebanese culture by Maronitic presence. In contrast, a different school focused on 
the Arabian identity in Syria as a whole. This dichotomy resulted in the choice of dividing the 
area in 1919. The Maronite supremacy has since defined Lebanese nationalism, in contrast to 
pan-Arabianism or Syrianism. 
This case was selected because the religiously distinct Maronite minority experienced 
repression during the period, and has active separatism. Separatism has not been very visible 
post-Ta’if, but such discourses are present latent within the minority’s historical identity 
narrative. The question of why the Lebanese Christian Maronites did not develop rebel-
movements in the period of analysis is still not obvious. The level of repression was minor, 
with only two incidents registered in the MAR-data. Nevertheless, there are clear indications 
of relative deprivation, and Maronites have a recent history of religious militias, and inter-
communal warfare based on such grievances. The potential for relative deprivation being 
present in both periods, the contrast between the minority during the Civil War and the years 
that followed creates a potential for a comparative perspective. I therefore define the period of 
analysis from the end of the Civil War in 1990 and end it in 2005 in accordance with the other 
two analyses. The civil war years from 1975-1990 will serve as the comparative perspective, 
similar to the Coptic diaspora. With this in mind, the chapter of the civil war will be given 
more room. I will also include an introduction to the Lebanese nationalist narratives as this 
identity plays a central role. Because the Church became an important political figure in the 
post-war years, distinguishing religious developments from the historical developments in the 
period of analysis is difficult. This chapter will therefore partially overlap with the following 
chapter on religious dynamics. The latter will in turn focus more exclusively on religious 
movements and dynamics from 1975-2005. Towards the end I will discuss religion as 
identity, opportunity, and motive for Maronitic rebellion. 
4.3.1 Maronite Supremacy and the Civil War: 1975-1990 
The modern history of Lebanon can be said to begin with the French mandate, and the 
division between Syria and Lebanon after WWI. At this point the Lebanese and Syrian 
nationalisms had led the earlier undivided area under Ottoman rule, to be separated into two 
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states. The Lebanese nationalism was thus formulated in contrast to Syrianism. Firro (2004:1) 
finds conceptualizations of Syria as a cultural unit distinct from other Arab cultures, from the 
1830s. By the 1920s the idea of Greater Syria, based on distinctions between Syria and other 
Arabian cultures, had grown into Arabism or Syrianism in contrast to Lebanese nationalism, 
which focused more exclusively on Maronitic particularism (Firro 2004:2). 
The content of this anti-Arabic nationalism was formed around historical, cultural and 
ethnical arguments. Firstly, the Maronites were historically refugees who found a safe haven 
in the Lebanese mountains during the fifth century, creating a Christian enclave in the Muslim 
Middle East (Haddad 2002:318). After this several waves of refugees from Muslim rulers 
partake in the identity narrative of Maronite nationalism (Haddad 2002b:30; Firro 2004:13-
14). Finally, Lebanese nationalist narrative underlines European invaders as allies and 
liberators (Firro 2004:3-4; Hagopian 1989:109). The perception of the Crusaders as liberators, 
which remained after the occupation ended in 1270 is considered to have become a part of the 
Maronite culture, followed by the unification with the Roman Catholic Church (Firro 
2004:12; Haddad 2002a:318). Throughout shifting regimes, Mount Lebanon’s Landscape 
resulted in relative autonomy and an “ethnographic purity”, giving room to develop a distance 
to proximal cultures (Tabet 1920:88 in Firro 2004:11).This has produced a narrative that 
frames Maronites as a nation present in the region to protect it against Arab Muslims. This 
has been used to argue Maronite particularism and chauvinism, known as Maronitism (Firro 
2004:23-24; Haddad 2002b:32). One effect of this towards the Civil War was a people feeling 
“under siege in their own land” (Rowe 2005:97). 
The process of independence during the French mandate resulted in a separate state in 1943, 
created in protection of the Christian minority (Rowe 2005:95; Haddad 2002b:31). It was 
formed as a sectarian democratic system, where each of the four religious minorities was 
represented according to their size in the 1937 census. This was done to secure the Christians, 
but ensure an efficient political system Christian parties were dependent on support from 
other parties. This led to originally sectarian parties forming a secular platform; a paradox as 
sectarian identities remained strong (Rowe 2005:96). Through the 1960s and 70s the question 
of the Palestinian refugees and PLO setting up headquarters in Lebanon actualized the 
question of sectarian identities and Maronite hegemony (Hegelian 1989:101). Whereas 
Lebanese Muslims fostered solidarity towards the refugees, Maronites had developed an 
alliance with Israeli Zionists as early as the 1930s (Haddad 2002b:32). This produced a 
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sectarian polarization, where Maronites became more chauvinistic and Lebanese Muslims 
turned towards pan-Arabism. Within this environment the political system became inefficient, 
and became replaced by a system of smaller parties and militias formed by networks of 
kinship and around local leaders (zuama). Among these was the Phalange movement, a 
Lebanese nationalist movement formed in the 1930s around the Gemayel family. These 
groups articulated “(…) aggressive nationalistic claims backed up by local and regional 
militias (…)” resulting in a “(…) competitive nationalistic system of religious communalism” 
and a growing sense of deprivation (Rowe 2005:97). The Muslim response to Maronite 
chauvinism was to support pan-Arabism (Rowe 2005:98). When Maronite leaders formed the 
Lebanese Front was in 1975, its goal was to ensure Chauvinistic Maronite hegemony in 
Lebanon parallel to the Zionist project of Israel (Haddad 2002b:33; Baroudi and Tabar 
2009:197; Hagopian 1989:101). Through the early 1970s the militarized nationalistic 
movements became increasingly aggressive, seeing their Christian identity in ascriptive terms 
(Rowe 2005:98). 
In addition the Lebanese National Front (LNF) was formed, uniting the other minorities in the 
goal of creating a secular Lebanese state. As PLO was becoming a strong factor in Lebanon 
and chose to support LNF, Maronite nationalist politicians feared their supremacy was 
threatened. In this environment they turned to Israel for support, further intensifying the 
conflict (Hagopian 1986:106). Part of the growing conflict can thus be seen as a spillover 
effect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but the overall motive of the war from the Maronite 
actors was to ensure Christian Maronitic culture as the core of the Lebanese state. 
Towards the end of the 1970s the Maronite militias were unified in the Lebanese Forces (LF). 
This movement was a hard line militant movement driven by many of the same goals as the 
Lebanese Front, which it engulfed in the early 1980s. Supported by Israel LF had several 
successful campaigns in Southern Lebanon, and secured Bashir Gemayel the Presidency in 
August 1982 (Rowe 2005:99, Hagopian 1986:107). His presidency was brief, and after his 
assassination on September 14th his brother Amin became president. Not possessing the 
political talent of his brother, the movement soon faced several problems. Amin did not have 
the same capability to cooperate with the Muslim leaders, nor did he manage to control the 
LF. The accord he accepted with Israel in 1983 further heightened the temperature. This 
hardened the inter-sectarian relations in Lebanon and became a turning point in the conflict. 
Druze forces drove LF back, and Muslim units within the military mutinied. The 1985 
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tripartite agreement, negotiated by Syria between representatives from Druze, Shi’ite and 
Christian minorities, and signed by LF-leader Hobeika, further added to this tendency. The 
agreement was an attempt at settling the conflict, but internal disagreement within LF 
regarding its content resulted in Samir Geagea toppling Hobeika's command over the forces. 
Responding to this, Syrian forces went into the “Christian heartlands” reducing their control, 
and Muslim ministers paralyzed the government. By 1986 the Maronite political unity was 
scattered, their control was minimal, and they had no central figure to gather around (Baroudi 
and Tabar 2009:199).  In this vacuum of power the newly elected Patriarch Sfeir seized a 
position. Sfeir was of the belief that Maronites no longer could solve the conflict by military 
means, and aimed for a solution where Lebanon would be ruled by consensus (Baroudi and 
Tabar 2009:200). 
In 1988 Gemayel stepped down as president and handed the position over to General Aoun. 
Patriarch Sfeir and the new president saw eye to eye on several issues, but on one crucial they 
diverged. Whereas Sfeir opted for consensus, Aoun was determined to keep the presidency 
for himself. This resulted in quite different positions towards the Ta’if negotiations that would 
end the civil war (Haddad 2002b:33). Whereas Aoun did not support the negotiations, Sfeir 
was positive to the overall attempt. Seeing it as the only realistic path towards peace he signed 
the final agreement, becoming central in legitimizing the accord. When Ilyas Hrawi was 
elected president later the same year, Sfeir chose to side with him giving further legitimacy to 
the process in the years to come (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:201). 
Whether the reason for Sfeir to accept the Ta’if accord was of lack of other options or to 
achieve peace in a Lebanon remains unanswered. The literature is divided with regards to this, 
but most probably both factors played a part: While the complaints of the Christian population 
grew in the following years, and the patriarch chose to side with Palestinians and criticized 
the West, he also favored moderation and made efforts to stop increasing disadvantages for 
Christians (Haddad 2002b:33-4; Baroudi and Tabar 2009:201; Rowe 2005:100-101). 
4.3.2 Coming to terms with Positions in a new Reality: 1990-2005 
From 1990 to 1992 the adaptation of the Ta’if represents the decisive blow fragmenting the 
Maronites. The first year saw an intra-communal civil war over the accord, fought between 
LF under Geagea and Aoun controlling parts of the army each (Sirriyeh 1998:62). Following 
this, Syria managed to oust Aoun, the main obstacle towards implementation of Ta’if, and the 
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same month another Maronite leader, Danny Chamoun, was assassinated. This was blamed on 
Geagea, who was convicted for life (Sirriyeh 1998:63-4). As a result, by the mid 1990s all of 
the central Maronitic leaders from the civil war were dead, exiled or imprisoned. The leaders 
who were left were not as extreme, and also weaker (Sirriyeh 1998:65). 
One of these leaders was pro-Syrian president Hrawi. His first task was to implement the 
Ta’if agreement, executed through the Government of National Unity headed by Omer 
Karami (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:202). Central in the accord was a renegotiation of the 
power-sharing model of 1943. Representation in parliament became a 1:1 ratio rather than 
6:5. Further, the army was reorganized and absorbed the militias. The power of the Maronite 
president was reduced, and the bureaucracy was to include more Muslims. This resulted in 
Maronite dissatisfaction, but the agreement hindered particularist claims (Sirriyeh 1998:61). 
The government also chose to sign a treaty of “Brotherhood” with Syria giving Damascus 
extended influence over Lebanese politics (Sirriyeh 1998:65; Baroudi and Tabar 2009:203). 
Maronites had given away much power to settle the peace only to see it all disappear in the 
Syrian presence (Haddad 2002b:34). 
Patriarch Sfeir had originally supported the Ta’if, but seeing how Maronite politicians 
implemented it he began voicing concerns and frustration of on behalf of the minority, which 
continued to do throughout the period (Sirriyeh 1998:64; Baroudi and Tabar 2009:204). 
Towards 1992 he initiated a boycott of the parliamentary elections, as a protest against unfair 
electoral districts (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:203). But instead of being heard, the election 
represented a new disaster for the Maronites, as the boycott only resulted in more pro-Syrian 
Maronite parliamentary representatives (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:204). 
In the wake of the war Lebanon found itself in a growing economical crisis. Unemployment 
rates were reaching 35% and the Lebanese pound was decreasing in value (Najem 1998:31-
33). By 1992 the financial crisis had reached such a critical point that Damascus intervened, 
installing Rafiq Hariri as prime minister to deal with the financial problems (Najem 1998:30, 
36). Hariri’s government produced the program Horizon 2000, which aimed to double the 
GDP over a 10-year period (Najem 1998:34). However, the economical problems continued 
to increase and in 1998 reached a new crisis that few believed Hariri could deal with (Baroudi 
and Tabar 2009:109). In an attempt to regain momentum Hariri initiated a series of meetings 
with leaders of the private sector, political blocks, and religious leaders. Meeting with Sfeir in 
March, Sfeir presented a summary of all criticism the church held against political 
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developments since the early 1990s. The result was a heated discussion, which ended without 
any agreement (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:211). Much of the reason Sfeir took this position was 
that he, as most Christians, felt President Hrawi did not defend his own community. In 
addition Hrawi’s presidency had been extended by Damascus. The end of his presidency was 
thus a spark of hope. Emile Lahoud, who followed Hrawi, seemed more independent in 
relation to Syria (Sirriyeh 1998:65). The first four years of his presidency was spent in a 
conflicted relationship with Hariri, which led Sfeir to support Lahoud (Nizameddin 2006:97). 
But, towards 2004 his liking of the president diminished. 
From the beginning of his presidency Lahoud initiated a process to remove Israel from 
southern Lebanon. This included support of Hezbollah attacking the South Lebanese Army 
(SLA), which Israel backed. The SLA had controlled southern Lebanon as an Israeli proxy 
since 1978. Even though Lahoud refused to send the Lebanese army into the southern 
territories, Hezbollah managed to significantly weaken the SLA, and by May 2000 its soldiers 
were fleeing and Israeli forces were withdrawn (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:212). In the absence 
of Israeli military presence Sfeir and the Council of Maronite Bishops began directing 
criticism towards the Syrian presence. 
In the 2000 Parliament elections Bkirki12 chose the opposite approach to 1992. By motivating 
the Christian population, the new parliament consisted of far more representatives 
sympathetic to Bkirki (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:214). This gave more room for criticism 
regarding Syrian hegemony, which grew in intensity. Throughout the first part of 2001 anti-
Syrian rallies were met by pro-Syrian demonstrations in a heated environment. This was 
intensified after a trip to US where Sfeir repeated his anti-Syrian arguments. The criticism 
received support from both the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and former Prime Minister 
Karami. Still, Bkirki was also accused of running errands of the West. Emerging from the 
situation was a Christian minority united for the first time in over 10 years (Baroudi and 
Tabar 2009:2016-8). 
Following the September 11th attack on the World Trade Center, the US began to pursue a 
harder line in politics in the Middle East. This included putting pressure on Damascus and 
Syrian politics. Following this Bkirki held back much of his criticism against Syria so as not 
give support to the US cause. Equally, during the 2003 US Iraqi-invasion, rather than 
                                                 
12 The seat of the Patriarchate. 
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supporting the US, Sfeir spoke against the invasion. This received praise from Damascus, pro-
Syrian politicians, and Muslim leaders, but still; Sfeir's criticism against the Syrian presence 
continued as soon as it was politically viable (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:220-1). 
In 2004 Damascus extend Lahoud's presidency. In response to this, a united Lebanese 
opposition was formed, including Patriarch Sfeir, Jumblatt, Hariri and several others. For the 
first time since 1990 a strong political opposition within Lebanon opposed Syrian Hegemony, 
and was strengthened by the UNSC Resolution 1559 stating all foreign troops should leave 
Lebanon (Nizameddin 2006:96; Baroudi and Tabar 2009:202). When Hariri was assassinated 
in February 2005 this opposition became a central force in the ‘Cedar Revolution’. After the 
assassination, popular protest reached such a magnitude that the pro-Syrian government 
resigned, which eventually led to Syria withdrawing—ending a more or less ongoing military 
presence since 1975 (Knio 2008:446-8). 
4.3.3 Christian Shifts and Reactions: 1975-2005 
In the history if Lebanon the Church has had both a religious and political function. This has 
generally led to a more politically active church than other Eastern churches (Baroudi and 
Tabar 2009:197, Rowe 2005:86). However, from the independence until Sfeir the Patriarch 
chose to step back, the Patriarch no longer pursued politics and was only a spiritual leader, 
except for one incident in 1958. The needs of the people were secured through the state 
(Baroudi and Tabar 2009:197). Especially between 1975 and 1986 there is a consensus on the 
Church being passive. Henley (2008) meanwhile, contests the idea that the church was 
inactive in this period. Differentiating segments of the church that affected the conflict 
dynamics, he identifies three main religious actors; the Patriarch, the Monastic movement, 
and the Pope (2008:355-6). The Patriarch had a network that included high representatives, 
but had chosen to leave the wellbeing of the population in the hands of politicians. In addition 
the church encompassed different perceptions regarding the conflict, which paralyzed his 
power.The monastic orders had a much closer relation to the lay, and even though they were 
under the orders of the Patriarch this contact gave them a larger space to act within. The 
monastic orders were united under the Permanent Congress of Lebanese Monastic Orders, 
and saw the war in line with Lebanese nationalist narrative as a “struggle for the survival of 
Lebanon as a final bastion of Christianity in the Muslim-dominated East” (Henley 2008:356). 
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The monastic support of the Maronite militias was manifested in the roles abbots Naaman and 
Kassis played in the Phalange party, and in the Lebanese Front (Henley 2008:357). 
Whereas the Monastic orders supported the war, the Pope, in contrast to the Patriarch, chose a 
different line. The Patriarch is, even in a Uniate church, in reality not under Vatican rule 
(Faris 1992:218). As such, Maronites recognize the authority of the Pope but the autonomy of 
the Church remains. This double loyalty became tenser when the Vatican emphasized 
Lebanon as a model of cross-communal coexistence, and how the conflict was a spillover 
from the Israeli-Arab conflict (Henley 2008:359), which created tension between the monastic 
orders and the Vatican. Through several diplomatic missions to Lebanon, the Vatican voiced 
a need for dialogue, securing the Maronites’ position according to the 1943 national pact, and 
to protect the Palestinians from new persecutions (Henley 2008:359). The Vatican claimed to 
do this not to take sides in the conflict, but to place itself “above the politics”. The monastic 
orders however, saw this as treason (Henley 2008:360). Throughout the Civil War the conflict 
between the Vatican, Kassis and Naaman led to several confrontations (Henley 2008:61).  
The Patriarch, weakened between these oppositions continued to preach moderation and 
reconciliation throughout the conflict, but leading a divided church required far greater 
political talent and will to put the words into action (Henley 2008:357). This was exactly the 
sort of figure Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir would become in the following period. 
When Sfeir was elected in 1986 the actions taken by the Vatican had resulted in a streamlined 
hierarchy within the Church (Henley 2008:363). In with the political vacuum, Patriarch Sfeir 
arrived at the perfect moment. Considering it within his mandate to protect the Christians of 
Lebanon whilst realizing the Maronites were out of options, he became active in the political 
sphere, taking sides in the conflict and giving legitimacy to the Ta’if negotiations and accord 
(Baroudi and Tabar 2009:197-200). It has been suggested that Sfeir was pressured to choose 
the line of the Vatican, but it has also been argued that he agreed with the position. One can 
also find evidence of the Patriarch changing the position of the Vatican (Henley 2008:365). 
The period 1990-2005 saw a lack of political focus on the concerns and interests of the 
Maronites, and Sfeir became the main voice of these topics. After the 1992 election he had 
even fewer political alliances within parliament (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:204). Towards 1994 
his public complaints grew, but were largely ignored until the 1994 Easter Sermon. After 
Geagea was sentenced to life based on what Sfeir saw as indecisive evidence, the Easter 
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sermon represented a summary of the complaints he focused on the rest of the decade: 
Maronite representation and the Ta’if implementation, the persecution of Maronite leaders, 
and harassment of Christians (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:204-5). Still, his goal was never a 
Christian state led by the Maronites, but equality among the different religious communities. 
The sermon infuriated the national politicians, and between Easter and June government 
officials boycotted Bkirki. Meanwhile, Sfeir refused to stop voicing the complaints, and 
despite little support within the Parliament he managed to politicize the issues. To a growing 
extent his position became one that the political figures aligned themselves with or against. 
He thus succeeded in altering the political agenda related to the Maronites (Baroudi and Tabar 
2009:206). 
After protesting extension of Hrawis presidency the top three leaders negotiated with Sfeir. 
He attempted to couple issues with the question of Hrawis presidency, but his demands were 
too big, and without any agreement Damascus decided to overrule any hesitation (Baroudi 
and Tabar 2009:206-7). In the years that followed Sfeir would be more careful in trying to 
change issues he could not, but continued to protest and voice the concerns of his people 
when the political leaders did not.  
In the winter of 1995 the Maronitic church held its synod in Rome. In its final message it 
emphasized the need for inter-religious and inter-communal dialogue and openness, 
especially between Muslims and Christians. It called for a withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli 
troops, and stressed the culturally pluralistic and democratic Lebanon (Baroudi and Tabar 
2009:207). This led to strong reactions from Muslim leaders who,  though they supported the 
need for dialogue, also resented the notion of cultural pluralism, as it was a rejection of 
Lebanese Arabism (Baroudi and Tabar 2009:208). 
Through emphasis on dialogue and cooperation Sfeir clearly positioned himself closer to the 
idea of Lebanon as a Middle Eastern construct rather than a Western. This assumption is also 
underpinned by his views on Palestinians and the US Iraqi invasion in 2003, and the way he 
stopped his criticism of Syria when it would strengthen the US cause. Where the militant 
nationalists identified with the West and Israel, Sfeir criticizes the US invasion in line with 
the Lebanese Muslim-communities (Hagopian 1989:103; Rowe 2005:101; Baroudi and Tabar 
2009:221). 
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4.3.4 Religion as Identity 
The Maronites are both ethnically and religiously distinct from their surrounding neighbors, 
all of which play into the religious identity. Being a Maronite is closely related to the history 
of the area, the national myth, and all has played into the narrative framing Maronites as 
having a mission to protect Christians from the surrounding Muslims in the area. During the 
Civil War and as the political leaders began to perceive their religious identity in more 
prescriptive terms, it was exactly this form of religious identity narrative that was 
emphasized. 
Unlike the Egyptian Copts, Maronites communication of common descent informs them of 
their inherent difference from the Muslims. The wholeness of reality and Lebanon was 
guaranteed by Maronite supremacy, and claimed to be the sole reason for the war (Sirriyeh 
1998:59). On can therefore say that the lay Maronite politicians saw the religious identity as a 
justification for their pursuit for power. On the other hand, a link between power and the 
ecclesiastic structure lacked. One can therefore equally claim that religion was not the 
justification of power. This either suggests that religion was used to argue a particularism, and 
through this the gain of power, or that religion as communication of descent informed that 
regional power should remain amongst those that shared that particular common descent. The 
fact that the politicians saw their religious identity in prescriptive terms suggests the latter is 
the most correct, but the first aspect is probably not untrue either. 
Even though the Maronite identity emphasizes their difference, they see themselves as having 
close bonds to the West. This is true both with regards to political support, and with regards to 
whom they feel most loyalty towards. During the civil war Maronites expected support from 
the West and perceived themselves as a Western cell in a Muslim land on several occasions. 
The national myth and the fact that the Maronitic church is a Uniate Catholic church further 
support this. Also the fact that Maronites throughout the war sought Western and Israeli 
alliances rather than Arab underpins this. Whether this network is of a religious form or not is 
questionable, but the religious identity arguably plays a central role given the common 
Christian bond and how this communicates into the national myth. 
After the civil war the Nationalist political leaders were dead, exiled or politically isolated. 
Religion, as it has been applied in the post-war years, is associated with a rather different 
identity-narrative. Instead of letting religion become a narrative that informs ethnic and 
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religious supremacy, religious institutions have emphasized a narrative wherein the local 
identity and the need for cross-cultural interaction and cooperation have been central. There 
are several reasons for this shift. Firstly the effective removal of the political leaders from the 
civil war gave the authority to voice the concerns of the people over to the Patriarch. He did 
not follow the same hard line of particularism of the civil war, neither during nor after the 
Ta’if accord. Secondly, the influence of the Vatican began to make its presence, pushing for 
peace in the region. This shift became visible in several ways. 
Following the civil war the emphasis on religion as communication of common descent has 
diminished slightly in importance. As Maronites are still ethnically, geographically and 
religiously distinct, and the model of government still is based on a sectarian system, descent 
still has the same relevance as it did during the civil war. Nevertheless it seems to have gained 
less importance, as the Patriarch has emphasized the need for cooperation rather than 
supremacy. In many ways religion as communication of power has decreased in importance, 
more so than common descent. 
Perhaps more important are changes in the identity-network. The Maronites can be said to 
have, out of necessity, reorganized into a neo-millet system after the war, with the Patriarch as 
the main voice for the concerns of the people. Rather than aiming for a supreme Maronitic 
state where a “Western cell of Maronites strive to overcome a Muslim invasion”, the Patriarch 
emphasizes the local belongingness within Lebanon as a multi-cultural state. The Vatican is 
still above the Patriarch, but instead of viewing their network in prescriptive ways, it seems 
they have begun to see themselves more as an integrated part of the region, taking sides with 
the Palestinians, and working towards dialogue and cooperation rather than pursuing a 
conflict line towards Muslim Lebanese. Choosing to hold back on criticism not to give the US 
an edge in their criticism of Syria, shows that the Patriarch perceives Maronites more in 
Middle Eastern terms than as Western allies. 
Summing up, the main changes have not happened within the notion of common descent. The 
emphasis of ethno-religious identity as justification for power has changed drastically and the 
perception of the network has changed significantly. This seems related to several factors, of 
which the political position of the Patriarch is important. Nevertheless this could also, as 
several scholars have implicated, simply be a product of a change in the minority’s 
opportunity to rebel. 
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4.3.5 Religion as Opportunity 
Opportunity plays a more central part in this case than the two previous. Even though one 
could argue that the Maronites have the funds, support from groups in exile, geographical 
concentration, and the organizational structure necessary to develop a military organization in 
the post-war years, there are external factors that alter the opportunity factor. 
During the civil war opportunity is found at several levels. The Cold War offered the 
opportunity to trigger external support. By framing their cause as proxies of the Israeli–
Palestine conflict, as well as the US–Soviet conflict itself, Maronite militias and political 
leaders had an opportunity to get a military edge in the conflict (Gerges 1997:99-101). The 
fact that Maronites represented the most influential political factor in Lebanon at the time 
gave them an upper hand. A consequence of the destabilization of the political parties in the 
period leading up to the civil war was more power to the zuama, which in turn were the main 
propagators of Maronitism and the most important voice of Maronitic grievances. 
Looking at the religious influence on opportunity, the overall influence was scarce. The 
monastic movements, with their close connection to the lay political leaders, did indeed 
legitimize the cause, thereby probably making it easier to recruit and motivate militia soldiers. 
The Patriarch, however, neither had the possibility, capability, nor will to interfere. The 
Vatican represented a voice that went against the perception of the Maronitic political leaders. 
In that sense, the religiousness of the conflict must be seen as a lay religious interpretation 
done by politicians. 
Since the implementation of the Ta’if agreement, opportunity to rebel has been little: Firstly, 
all the political leaders the militias were organized around were no longer present in the 
political landscape. Further, the militias themselves had actively been hindered from 
reorganizing, partly by being integrated into the army, and partly by being hindered. This has 
led a significant part of the literature to conclude that opportunity is the main reason for why 
the Maronites have not developed rebellion in the post war years. Another part of the 
literature points to the role of the Patriarch as central for understanding the lack of rebellion. 
The Patriarch and the church have become the minority hegemon. Sfeir has indeed been 
active in propagating a peaceful approach to inter-communal relations. Still, assuming that 
this was an effect of the Syrian military presence also means that one has to set as a criterion 
that Sfeir would use the opportunity to get an upper hand when the this offered itself. Thus, 
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when Sfeir chooses to hold back criticism of Syrian military presence in 2003 in order not to 
support a western cause, such a hypothesis is weakened. His politics has throughout been 
peace oriented and dialogical, and have not sought to build a military capacity or to give 
Maronites a position to rebel. 
From this I conclude that whereas the opportunity was present during the Civil War-years, the 
relevance of religion was minimal. During the period of analysis opportunity was not present, 
but sources suggest that the Patriarch, as the minority hegemon, would not have made use of 
such an opportunity had it offered itself. 
4.3.6 Religion as Motive 
Through the period of the Civil War motive for Maronites was largely related to what they 
perceived as their right to enjoy a privileged position in Lebanese politics. Viewing their 
religious identity in ascriptive terms, lay political leaders chose to protect the Christians in the 
Middle East on behalf of the West. Perceiving their political position as threatened by the 
PLO and the growing number of the Muslim population as a whole, strengthened the motive. 
The fact that Maronite politicians had to lean on secular political agendas within a sectarian 
political system also led to this overall perception of relative deprivation and threat. 
Between 1990 and 2005 the sense of deprivation has primarily been voiced by Patriarch Sfeir. 
His complaints have focused on the way the Ta’if accord has been implemented, but not the 
accord itself. He has raised issues where Maronites have been treated unfairly, but not 
questioned the legitimacy of the idea of the power sharing. Perhaps most central in his 
complaints has been the military presence of Syrian forces within Lebanese territory. 
Nevertheless, this criticism has been followed by reassurance of the proximity of the two 
states rather than underpinning the argument by pulling on support from existing conflicts 
between Israel, or the US and Syria. The Patriarch has worked for improvement of the 
situation of the Maronites within the Lebanese context throughout, but has not used situations 
to agitate the population. At the most he has initiated boycotts and protest, but when 
protesters have been treated unfair, as happened in 2001, he has been careful not to do 
anything to agitate the population, but rather tried to calm the situation. It would be 
reasonable to expect a formation of deprivation related to the lost position of the pre-war 
years, but this has gone against the agenda of the Patriarch and effectively been held back, at 
best being a marginal opinion. 
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In summary, it seems that the Patriarch has acted according to an identity that placed 
Maronites in a Muslim environment. This identity has suggested dialogue and cooperation 
with the Arab neighbors. This stands in a sharp contrast to the Maronitic identity during the 
Civil War, which informed Maronites of a mission as a Western cell that was to secure its 
position as hegemon. 
4.3.7 Summary Discussion: A Western Cell in a Land of Enemies 
Across the two periods analyzed in the Maronitic case there are two trends that stand out in 
relation to religion. During the Civil War lay politicians articulated the religious identity. 
These saw Maronites as representatives of Western Christianity and felt alienated and 
threatened by growing Muslim influence. At the same time the same politicians expressed 
trust towards Western powers. 
After the Civil war the Patriarch became the minority hegemon. He emphasized an identity of 
belongingness within the multi-cultural Lebanese society. Remaining a strong voice for 
Maronitic concerns, he clearly moved away from the network identity of the Civil War, where 
the Christian-Western identity informed Maronite chauvinism. Even though there were many 
reasons for feeling deprived and developing motives for rebellion, this has not happened 
under Sfeir’s Patriarchy. The identity of common descent is however still present, but no 
longer communicating power in the same way. As with the former cases the western identity 
is associated with rebellion, whereas a local identity is associated with the opposite. 
As with the prior cases religious leaders, or leaders that are first and foremost spiritual leaders 
and political leaders second, at most, are associated with dialogue, less conflict and inter-
communal cooperation. Political leaders that apply a religious rhetoric are, on the other hand, 
associated with separatism and heightened conflict intensity. 
Finally, the pattern where identity and motive operate in accordance with one another seems to 
be valid for the Maronites as well. During the Civil War the prevalent Maronitic identity was 
informing motive. Within that specific narrative military actions seem to have been justified. 
Within the dominant identity narrative of the post-war years this sense of urgency in terms of 
protecting a Maroinitic chauvinist state is gone. The identity informs Maronites to be 
Maronites but in a multicultural Lebanon. Grievances as motive only inform protest, and 
breaking the bond of the Middle Eastern community is out of the question. 
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In this analysis it is difficult to determine whether identity was altered to accommodate a need 
for motive, if lack of motive is a product of the identity shift, or if both are altered by a third 
factor. But, the connection between the two confirms the tendencies in the two previous cases. 
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5 Conclusions 
In concluding the three case-analyses of this thesis I will gather the arguments from the three 
summary discussions and view them in the light of the initially posed questions. I will do this 
thematically starting with how religion seems to interact with separatism towards developing 
rebellion. I will then discuss the findings regarding the different actors and how they apply 
religion. 
The questions posed in the beginning of the thesis were: Why is a religious minority under 
repression coupled with separatism a stronger predictor of rebellion than without separatism? 
What happens to religion when merged with separatism? And, what lies behind the indicator 
separatism? 
I further stated a set of expectations. Based on the notion that religion need not be political I 
hypothesize that separatism represents a factor that politicizes religion. Based on Fox (2004) I 
hypothesized that the religion separatism-nexus was parallel to the phenomenon religious 
nationalism as described by among others Juergensmeyer (1993). 
5.1 Identity, Opportunity and Motive 
Across the three cases religion as opportunity, motive and identity has changed. In Sudan the 
identity changed in the face of increased repression of such intensity that it represented an 
instant motive. In Egypt identity can be seen as a mechanism holding back the sense of 
relative deprivation. In Lebanon, whereas opportunity for rebellion was minimal after 1992, 
the shift in the identity mirrored the shift in motive. Throughout the analysis, identity-
narrative and motive have followed one another as interlocked phenomena. I find no reasons 
to assume that this is not a pattern that will be found across similar cases. 
When the identity communicates a bond to the repressor, a certain level of repression can 
occur without triggering grievances. In Egypt the bond to the Egyptian Nation was stronger 
than the incidents of inter-communal violence and discrimination, and the bond with the West 
was not preferable. The opportunity was there, if the identity had informed it, but it did not. In 
Sudan the identity was one of anti-Western attitude, but in the face of forced religious 
legislation and violent oppression Southerners changed their identity to include English as 
common language and Christianity as uniting religion. In this case the repression was of such 
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a character that motive was imminent, and the shift in identity can be seen as a consequence 
of this—which again offered a narrative that enabled the Southerners to unite in their cause 
and around the new nation. In Lebanon, even though the Maronites were better of in 1974 
than in 1992, the Western identity and chauvinism produced a motive to choose a military 
solution. After 1992 the renewed and more locally based identity followed a higher 
acceptance of what the minority was willing to yield to other Lebanese communities. 
Differentiating between hard causes, such as power-politics and violence, and soft causes, 
such as religion, identity and grievances, it is possible to identify the following mechanism: 
Soft causes can, if a certain level of hard causes is present, push the motive in the direction of 
the identity narrative. If identity-narratives securitize an issue, and there is certain 
reasonability to that claim, a motive can be created. Equally, if the identity-narrative frames a 
repressive act as marginal, it can hinder development of motive. But, if hard causes become 
too strong, and a motive becomes imminent, the soft causes will accommodate the need for a 
narrative to frame the motive. 
Religious minority rebellion can thus be driven both by identity, contrary to what Nordås 
suggest, and by motive, but in neither of the cases can religion as identity be explained as a 
primordial identity. It is inherently a contextual construct. 
5.2 Separatism and Nationalism 
Separatism as found in the MAR-dataset cannot be said to equal nationalism. This gets 
strongly underlined in the Egyptian case where the Coptic (religious?) nationalism has 
informed peaceful responses. This contradicts Fox’s use of it. Separatism is however a good 
indicator for whether the religious identity is prone to create motives or not. 
5.3 Religious Institutions and Actors 
A rather surprising finding, in all cases, is the fact that religious leaders are associated with 
peace initiatives, dialogue and inter-communal cooperation. On the other hand, lay or secular 
politicians are associated with heightened conflict intensity. I will not say that one of the two 
is better than the other, but the pattern is so clear that it cannot be ignored. 
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There are a number of possible reasons for this pattern. If it is representative, it is not 
regarding religious leaders in general. Many religious leaders engage in conflicts, but Sri 
Lankan Buddhist monks, the Cyprian Orthodox Church, the Serbian and the Greek Orthodox 
Churches are all has taken it upon themselves to embody the national chauvinism. But these 
are not minorities, but majority religions. If this is representative it only regards minority 
religions. Whether this is representative or not, and under what preconditions it occurs, 
becomes a question for further investigation. 
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Appendix I: Case Selection Data 1996-2000, 
Minorities at Risk Dataset 
Two minorities, both with religious difference and no relevant level of rebellion, one with 
(A) and one without (B) an active separatist movement 
 
The following data is based on material retrieved through the MARGene system, designed for 
feeding data with specific variables from the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR). It is not 
retrieved in the same way as Fox did when he did his studies, but the general patterns should 
be the same. For more information see the MAR web-pages. 15 
The following selection of cases are sorted in a way so that all minorities have a different 
religion than the majority (belief=3). Further there is no registered intrastate conflict in the 
time period (reb=0). This analysis looks at what cases are relevant to analyze further, based 
on unprovoked repression being one of the strongest indicators of grievance development in 
minorities, thus being a strong predictor of rebellion. As the above analysis is common for 
two of the cases needed I also control for active separatism in the separatism index (sepx).  
The scatterplots, or visual representation of each form of repression, is systematized in the 
following manner. From left to right you have an indicator of repression from  “no 
repression”, “repression of politically engaged members”, and  “repression of both engaged 
and  non-engaged members”, to “repression against non-engaged group members”. From 
bottom  to top cases are sorted in accordance to the level of separatism registered, from “no 
separatism”, “historical separatism”, “latent separatism” and "active separatism”. 
There are a total of 23 indicators of repression in the MAR-data. This is a presentation of the 
7 most significant ones based on existing coding for the selected time-frame. The selection of 
cases will be done on the basis of the far right indicator where repression is unprovoked, but 
for this presentation I choose to include the entire range of repression to secure transparence. 
The following cases report no rebellion and religious difference. Cases that fit the criteria 
perfectly are written in bold. Cases that are slightly off by one of the criteria are included in 
italic. This is to secure a broader analysis where all cases and all repression are accounted for 
in a representing way. 
                                                 
15 http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/margene/mar-codebook_040903.pdf 
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In the end I summarize and rank each case based on number of years for each minority 
counted. I choose to sort the cases according to bold and italic cases because they signify 
relevance. 
Repression 1: Many group members arrested: 
 
Minorities       Years 
A: Repr. unprovoked/Sep 3: 
66002: Maronite Christians in Lebanon  1 
B: Repr. unprovoked/Sep 0: 
 22006: Muslims in France    1 
 65101: Copts in Egypt    1 
 76001: Lhotshampas in Bhutan   1 
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Repression 2: Few group members arrested: 
 
Minorities      Years 
A: Sep 3: 
66002: Maronite Christians in Lebanon 1 
63003: Bahai in Iran    3 
B: Sep 0: 
 65101: Copts in Egypt   2 
63010: Christians in Iran   2 
 47504: Ogani in Nigeria   1 
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Repression 3: Leaders arrested disappeared or detained: 
 
Minorities      Years 
A: Sep 3: 
 51001: Zanzibaranz in Tanzania  1 
B: Sep 0: 
 63010: Christians in Iran   3 
 53007: Amhara in Ethiopia   1 
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Repression 4: Show trials of members or leaders: 
 
 
Minorities      Years 
A: Sep 3: 
63003: Bahai in Iran    4 
B: Sep 0: 
 53007: Amhara in Ethiopia   1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
 
Repression 5: Torture to intimidate or interrogate: 
 
Minorities        Years 
A: Sep 3: 
 77502: Zomis (Chins) in Burma    2 
77501: Rohingya (Arakanese, Muslims) in Burma 1 
B: Sep 0: 
 65101: Copts in Egypt     1 
 53007: Amhara in Ethiopia     1 
 47504: Ogani in Nigeria     4    
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Repression 6: Members executed by authorities: 
 
Minorities        Years 
A: Sep 3: 
 63003:Bahai in Iran      1 
 77501: Rohingya (Arakanese, Muslims) in Burma  2 
B: Sep 0: 
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Repression 7: Leaders executed by authorities: 
 
Minorities        Years 
A: Sep 3: 
 63003:Bahai in Iran      1 
B: Sep 0: 
 63010: Christians in Iran     2 
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Summary of repression/years and rel.dif. for each minority: 
A: Active Separatism:     Years:   Rel.dif.: 
66002: Maronite Christians in Lebanon   2   Chr/Musl 
77502: Zomis (Chins) in Burma    2   Chr/Budh 
77501: Rohingya (Arakanese, Muslims) in Burma 1   Musl/Budh 
63003: Bahai in Iran      9   Oth/Musl 
51001: Zanzibaranz in Tanzania    1   Musl/Chr 
77501: Rohingya (Arakanese, musl) in Burma  2   Musl/Budh 
 
 
B: No Separatism: 
65101: Copts in Egypt     4   Chr/Musl 
53007: Amhara in Ethiopia     2   Chr/Musl 
22006: Muslims in France     1   Musl/Chr 
63010: Christians in Iran     7   Chr/Musl 
47504: Ogani in Nigeria     5   Indig./Chr 
53007: Amhara in Ethiopia     1   Chri/Musl 
76001: Lhotshampas in Bhutan    1   Ind.Ch/Budh 
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Appendix II: Case Selection Data 1996-
2000, Minorities at Risk Dataset 
Minority with religious difference, active separatism and high conflict intensity 
 
The following data is based on material retrieved through the MARGene system, designed for 
feeding data with specific variables from the Minorities at Risk dataset (MAR). It is not 
retrieved in the same way as Fox did when he did his studies, but the general patterns should 
be the same. For more information see the MAR web-pages. 16 
The following selection of cases is sorted in such a way that only cases with a level of 
rebellion coded  to between 5 and 7 are included. The scale starts at 0 and ends at 7 being the 
highest level of rebellion. In other words, only intrastate conflicts where the minority has 
rebellious movements considered being more than small-scale insurgency, in accordance to 
the list REB copied from the coding manual at the end of the document. The additional list 
REBEL is added later, is not used by Fox, but describes the categories in more depth. Further, 
only minorities with a religion different from the majority are included. 
The separatism-index sepx is not used to sort the data, but the pattern visible is an echo of the 
pattern I intend to investigate in this thesis. The only cases with a different output are 75009, 
which is insignificant as there is latent separatism in the minority, and 36504, which seems to 
be a miscoding of the data as the Chechen conflict with Russia is considered to be a separatist 
conflict in the predominant part of the literature on the issue. 
The variable relnat does not exist in the original data, but is a result of a combination of the 
values in the variable belief and sepx (belief+1*sepx) applied by Jonathan Fox17 to calculate 
religious nationalism. It has no significant role in this summary, except as an indicator of the 
sum of active separatism and religious difference, and that this should follow the pattern and 
level of intrastate conflict in the way it does here. 
As a result this list profiles the most important intrastate conflicts between 1996 and 2000 
where religious difference can play a central role. The variable religs1 indicates the religion 
                                                 
16 http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/margene/mar-codebook_040903.pdf 
17 Fox, J. (2004) “The Rise of Religious Nationalism and Conflict: Ethnic Conflict and Revolutionary Wars, 1945-
2001” in Journal of Peace Research (41:715) 
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and denomination of the minority in accordance to the list copied from the coding manual at 
the end of the document. Additionally I have chosen to color code all cases according to 
religion (Christian /blue, Muslims/green, animists/purple, other/yellow). 
 
country Group numcode region year belief religs1 sepx reb relnat 
INDIA NAGAS 75009 3.0 1999 3 2.0 2 5 8 
AZERBAIJAN ARMENIANS 37301 2.0 1997 3 3.0 3 7 12 
INDONESIA PAPUANS 85005 3.0 1996 3 3.0 3 5 12 
RUSSIA CHECHENS 36504 2.0 1996 3 4.0 0 6 0 
RUSSIA CHECHENS 36504 2.0 1999 3 4.0 0 7 0 
RUSSIA CHECHENS 36504 2.0 2000 3 4.0 0 7 0 
INDIA KASHMIRIS 75007 3.0 1996 3 4.0 3 6 12 
INDIA KASHMIRIS 75007 3.0 1997 3 4.0 3 6 12 
INDIA KASHMIRIS 75007 3.0 1998 3 4.0 3 6 12 
INDIA KASHMIRIS 75007 3.0 1999 3 4.0 3 6 12 
INDIA KASHMIRIS 75007 3.0 2000 3 4.0 3 6 12 
THAILAND 
MALAY-
MUSLIMS 80002 3.0 1997 3 4.0 3 5 12 
PHILIPPINES MOROS 84003 3.0 1997 3 4.0 3 6 12 
PHILIPPINES MOROS 84003 3.0 1998 3 4.0 3 6 12 
PHILIPPINES MOROS 84003 3.0 1999 3 4.0 3 6 12 
PHILIPPINES MOROS 84003 3.0 2000 3 4.0 3 6 12 
SUDAN SOUTHERNERS 62501 6.0 1996 3 8.0 3 7 12 
SUDAN SOUTHERNERS 62501 6.0 1997 3 8.0 3 7 12 
SUDAN SOUTHERNERS 62501 6.0 1998 3 8.0 3 7 12 
SUDAN SOUTHERNERS 62501 6.0 1999 3 8.0 3 7 12 
SUDAN SOUTHERNERS 62501 6.0 2000 3 8.0 3 7 12 
SRI LANKA 
SRI LANKAN 
TAMILS 78002 3.0 1996 3 9.0 3 7 12 
SRI LANKA 
SRI LANKAN 
TAMILS 78002 3.0 1997 3 9.0 3 7 12 
SRI LANKA 
SRI LANKAN 
TAMILS 78002 3.0 1998 3 9.0 3 7 12 
SRI LANKA 
SRI LANKAN 
TAMILS 78002 3.0 1999 3 9.0 3 7 12 
SRI LANKA 
SRI LANKAN 
TAMILS 78002 3.0 2000 3 9.0 3 7 12 
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RELIGS1 Specific Religion(s): Most Numerous 36  
Missing Values: -99  
Value Label  
 
1 Roman Catholic  
2 Protestant  
3 Other Christian Sect  
4 Sunni  
5 Shi'ite  
6 Other Islamic Sect  
7 Buddhist  
8 Animist  
9 Other 
REB Annual Rebellion Index, 1985-2000 425  
Missing Values: -99  
Value Label  
0 None reported  
1 Political banditry  
2 Campaigns of terrorism  
3 Local rebellion  
4 Small-scale guerrilla activity  
5 Intermediate guerrilla activity  
6 Large-scale guerrilla activity  
7 Protracted civil war  
99 No basis for judgment 
REBEL Rebellion Index: 1945-99 424  
Missing Values: -99  
Value Label  
0 None reported  
1 Political banditry, sporadic terrorism  
2 Campaigns of terrorism  
3 Local rebellions  
Armed attempts to seize power in a locale.  
If they prove to be the opening round in  
What becomes a protracted guerrilla or  
civil war during the year being coded, code  
the latter rather than local rebellion. Code  
declarations of independence by a minority-  
controlled government here.  
4 Small-scale guerrilla activity  
All of the following must exist:  
1)fewer than 1000 armed fighters;  
2)sporadic armed attacks (less than  
six reported per year); and  
3)attacks in a small part of the area  
occupied by the group, or in one  
or two other locales.  
5 Intermediate guerrilla activity  
Has one or two of the defining traits  
of large-scale activity and one or  
two of the defining traits of  
small-scale activity.  
6 Large-scale guerrilla activity  
All of the following must exist: 
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1) more than 1000 armed fighters;  
2)frequent armed attacks (more than 6  
per year); and 3)attacks affecting a  
large part of the area occupied by  
the group.  
7 Protracted civil war  
Fought by rebel military units with  
base areas.  
99 No basis for judgment 
99 
 
Appendix III: Number of Religious 
Intrastate Armed Conflicts with Separatism 
and Different Religion or Denomination 
Based on Nordås’ Table A4-2. “Countries with Religious Intrastate Armed Conflicts (Issues 
Perspective) and Conflict Severity in Battle Deaths” augmented with data on religious 
difference and separatism. (Nordås 2010:235) 
Analysis of the numbers shows that of all religious intrastate armed conflicts 61,9% of the 
rebel groups have a separatist or secessionist agenda. Agendas that include nationalistic 
claims to power within the country is not included. 
Of the conflicts where minority and majority follow different religions or denominations the 
percentage of separatist agendas are 73,3%. 
Among the conflicts where the groups adhere to the same religion 21,4% have separatist 
agendas. 
Of all religious intrastate armed conflicts with separatist agendas, 88% were between groups 
with religious or denominational difference whereas 69% of the total selection. 
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State Conflict Religion issue Battle deaths 
 
Sep. Rel.dif. 
Afghanistan Various Islamists Major 558 200 
 
0 0 
Algeria Various Islamists Major 92 017 
 
0 0 
Bangladesh Chittagong Hill Tracts Minor 3 500 
 
1 1 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Croatian irregulars Minor 13 687 
 
1 1 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina Serb Minor 40 413 
 
1 1 
Chad Various insurgent groups Minor 39 961 
 
0 1 
Côte d'Ivoire Forces Nouvelles Minor 1 200 
 
0 1 
Egypt Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya Major 1 179 
 
0 0 
Eritrea Eretrean Islamic Jihad Major 391 
 
0 1 
Ethiopia Ogaden Major 42 091 
 
1 1 
Ethiopia al-Itahad al-Islami Minor 562 
 
1 1 
India Sikh insurgents Minor 18 875 
 
1 1 
India Kashmir insurgents Minor 26 501 
 
1 1 
India Bodoland Minor 743 
 
1 0 
India Tripura Minor 1 936 
 
1 0 
India Nagaland Minor 2 609 
 
1 1 
Indonesia East Timor Minor 3 352 
 
1 1 
Indonesia Aceh Minor 5 197 
 
1 0 
Iran Kurdistan Minor 11 399 
 
1 1 
Iraq Mujahideen e Khalq/PJAK Minor 10 082 
 
0 0 
Iraq Various Islamists Major 32 404 
 
0 0 
Israel Palestine Minor 16 959 
 
1 1 
Laos LRM (Hmong) Minor 23 555 
 
1 1 
Mali 
Islamic Arab Front of 
Azwad Minor 300 
 
0 0 
Myanmar Araken Minor 1 125 
 
1 1 
Myanmar Karen Minor 14 927 
 
1 1 
Myanmar Kachin Minor 19 032 
 
1 1 
Nigeria Northern Nigeria Major 52 
 
0 1 
Philippines Mindanao Major 42 295 
 
1 1 
Russia (Wahhabi) Major 350 
 
1 1 
Russia Chachnya Minor 97 400 
 
1 1 
Sri Lanka Tamil Tigers LTTE Minor 55 389 
 
1 1 
Sudan SLA/JEM Minor 6 013 
 
0 0 
Sudan Southern Sudan Major 75 853 
 
1 1 
Tajikistan United Tajik Opposition Minor 41 300 
 
0 0 
Thailand Patani Major 1 205 
 
1 1 
Trinidad/Tobago Jama'at al-Muslimeen Minor 30 
 
0 1 
Uganda Lord's Resistance Army Minor 122 894 
 
0 0 
UK IRA Minor 3 149 
 
1 1 
USA al-Qaida Major 7 415 
 
0 1 
Uzbekistan Jihad Islamic Group Major 107 
 
0 0 
Yugoslavia (Serbia) Kosovo Minor 4 500 
 
1 1 
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